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Assigning a disabled police officer to a ?desk job? held to be a reasonable accommodation

Assigning a disabled police officer to a ?desk job? held to be a reasonable accommodation
Keever v Middletown, 145 F.3d 809

According to the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, providing a ?desk job? as a reasonable accommodation to a disabled police officer satisfied Americans with Disabilities Act [ADA] accommodation requirements despite the fact that the officer preferred a different assignment.

Richard T. Keever, a Middletown, Ohio police officer, contended that the desk assignment was demeaning and involved reduced responsibility. He said that he should have either been given a different shift or assigned to a detective position. He sued, contending claiming that the City failed to accommodate his disability, unlawfully harassed him about his disability, and constructively discharged him from the force by forcing him to retire.

The court disagreed, finding no ADA violation. ADA, the court observed, does not require an employer to give an employee his or her ?preferred accommodation.? Under ADA the employer can make any reasonable accommodation it determines to be fit and appropriate.

According to the Sixth Circuit, ?in determining whether an accommodation is reasonable, the employer must consider (1) the particular job involved, its purpose, and its essential functions; (2) the employee?s limitations and how those limitations can be overcome; (3) the effectiveness an accommodation would have in enabling the individual to perform the job; and (4) the preference of the employee,? citing 29 CFR Section 1630.9(a).

Essentially the court concluded that Keever was not ?otherwise qualified? for the position of patrol officer, that he was not constructively discharged, and that he failed to establish a prima facie case of hostile work environment discrimination.

This ruling, made under federal law, may prove relevant to making ?light duty? assignments of personnel receiving disability benefits under Section 207-a or Section 207-c of New York?s General Municipal Law [GML].

As was noted in City of Cohoes v Local 2562, 94 NY2d 686, ?light duty? is based on the non-working individual?s medical condition and physical capacity rather than upon any contractual requirement. ?GML Section 207-a is properly understood as being independent of contractual provisions governing regular duty, by giving full pay to fully or partially disabled firefighters performing no work or only `light duty.??

In the words of the Court of Appeals:

"Our conclusion that appellants must submit medical evidence contesting the City's physician's findings in order to trigger a hearing is also supported by the holdings, in other contexts, that due process does not require a hearing on a claimed invasion of a property or liberty interest in governmental employment, until the employee has raised a genuine dispute on operative facts (see, Codd v Velger, 429 US 624, 627; Matter of Economico v Village of Pelham, 50 NY2d 120, 128; Matter of Dolan v Whalen, 49 NY2d 991, 993). Thus, the Appellate Division properly rejected appellants' claim of entitlement to a due process hearing before being ordered to return to duty.?

The Cohoes decision, however, implies that light duty could be viewed as a ?permissive subject? of collective bargaining under the Taylor Law and ultimately made subject to arbitration under the terms of the agreement.

Full post as published by New York Public Personnel Law on July 23, 2010 (boomark / email).