Federal Judiciary

Motion to Exclude Plaintiff's Liability Expert & for Summary Judgment Granted in Part

By Michael Smith

Wiggins v. Union Pacific R. Co., 2003 WL 25720982(E.D.Tex. Feb 03, 2003) (NO. CIV.A.2:02-CV-79)
Judge: T. John Ward
Holding: Motion to Exclude Expert & for Summary Judgment GRANTED in part.
This case presented an interesting question of preemption. The case involves a collision between a train and a vehicle at a crossing in Joaquin, Texas. Union Pacific moved to exclude one of the plaintiff's expert witnesses on the track condition at the time of the accident and for summary judgment as to the plaintiffs' claims that the defendant was negligent because its train was operating at an excessive rate of speed.  The Court noted that state law negligence claims that a train was going too darn fast are preempted by federal regulations which establish how fast a train can go based on the track condition classification.  In this case, plaintiffs intended to skin this particular cat by having an expert opine that the track should have been Class II, not Class IV, and thus that the top speed should have been 25 mph, not 60 mph.  The parties agreed that the speed of the train at the time was approximately 49 mph. 
"Although the plaintiffs' theory is not without some force," Judge Ward observed, "it immediately confronts pervasive federal regulations that govern the inspection, classification, and the re-classification of railroad tracks in need of repair. . . . It is not these federal regulations, standing alone, that impair the plaintiffs' negligence theory based on the excessive speed of the train. Federal and state regulations routinely set forth minimum safety standards-compliance with which would not ordinarily bar the state, through a common law negligence claim, from imposing more stringent duties. The business of rail safety, however, is different. Under 49 U.S.C. § 20106, Congress has urged national rail safety uniformity and has prohibited the state from imposing different requirements through tort suits, except under very limited circumstances. . . . It is, in other words, the preemption provisions contained in the statute and the regulations that prohibit the state, through its negligence regime, from imposing duties different from those required by federal law. Accordingly, Judge Ward concluded that "[w]hether the plaintiffs' negligence theory is viewed as a simple excessive speed claim . . . or the track classification theory presented in the present case, the regulations preempt the claim."
"This is not to say that the speed of the train is irrelevant," Judge Ward continued, beginning to craft the specific ruling in the case.  "[A] railroad could be liable for the breach of related tort duties, such as the duty to slow or stop a train to avoid a specific, individual hazard. (cite omitted). In the court's view, the question whether the railroad owed a duty to slow or stop a train to avoid a specific, individual hazard, such as the vehicle involved in the crossing collision in this case, presents a liability theory distinct from a more generalized claim that the railroad was negligent in operating the train at an excessive speed prior to the time a specific, individual hazard presented itself. (cite omitted). The latter theory is preempted. The question whether the former claim is preempted is best resolved after hearing the evidence at trial."
Accordingly, Judge Ward granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment that the plaintiffs' excessive speed claim is preempted "except to the extent that claim embraces a theory that the railroad was negligent in failing to stop or slow the train in response to a specific, individual hazard."  He therefore also granted the defendant's motion to exclude the plaintiffs' expert, Virginia Broussard, as her testimony purported to relate only to the negligence theory the court concluded was preempted.

Full post as published by Eastern District of Texas Federal Court Practice on June 04, 2008 (boomark / email).