Federal Judiciary

BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Circuit Judge. Trafalgar Corporation sought a federal court determination of its constitutional takings and equal protection claims against the Miami County Board of Commissioners and Concord Township. The district court dismissed the case on a motion for summary judgment finding that Trafalgar?s claims were barred by principles of preclusion. For the following reasons we AFFIRM the decision of the district court.

MERRITT, Circuit Judge. This consumer bankruptcy, Chapter 13 case arises because the debtor bought a car under a typical financing arrangement in which the lender retained a lien or mortgage on the car as security for payment of the outstanding loan that enabled the debtor to buy the car. The debtor proposed to surrender the car to the finance company as part of the Chapter 13 plan. The value of the car was less than the outstanding debt. Due to a glitch or gap in a recent revision of the Bankruptcy Code intended to benefit creditors, the law is now silent on what happens to the remaining indebtedness in the surrender-of-the-car situation. The bankruptcy court below held that the congressional mistake in drafting the revision means that the remaining indebtedness is completely wiped out. We believe the gap should be filled and the Congressional mistake corrected. The law previously governing this situation should be restored until Congress can correct its mistake and fill in the gap.

KENNEDY, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs, purchasers of bonds registered by GMAC in September 2003, brought suit under Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 against GMAC and its control persons, including General Motors, which at the time wholly-owned GMAC. Plaintiffs alleged that GMAC had breached its disclosure obligations as well as made material misstatements in its registration statements and prospectuses for multiple offerings of bonds registered in 2003 and 2004. The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs? complaint for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the defendants? motion. It found that plaintiffs lacked statutory standing to bring claims regarding offerings other than the one in which they had purchased. The district court also found that the plaintiffs had no claim regarding a duty to disclose because Item 303, the regulatory authority relied on by plaintiffs, did not give rise to a duty to disclose the information the plaintiffs sought because the information was not ?firm specific? to GMAC. Additionally, the district court found that there was no material omission because the affirmative statements made by GMAC were not rendered misleading by the absence of the information cited by plaintiffs. Lastly, the district court held that most of GMAC?s statements were not false, and the ones that were arguably false were not material to bond investors. We find that the named plaintiffs? own claims are without merit because the offering materials did not have material omissions because (1) Item 303 only imposes a duty to make forward-looking projections regarding known information, and plaintiffs pleaded only that the information was ?knowable?; and (2) GMAC?s affirmative statements were not rendered misleading by the absence of the information described by plaintiffs. We also find that the offering materials for the offering in which plaintiffs? purchased did not include material misstatements, because the affirmative statements made by GMAC were in fact true. Since the named plaintiffs? individual claims cannot succeed on the merits, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court dismissing plaintiffs? complaint.

McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. As with the law in general,1 the First Amendment is a jealous mistress. It enables the people to exchange ideas (popular and unpopular alike), to assemble with the hope of changing minds, and to alter or preserve how we govern ourselves. But in return, it demands that sometimes seemingly reasonable measures enacted by our governments give way.

The State of Ohio enacted a provision making it a felony to pay anyone for gathering signatures on election-related petitions on any basis other than the time worked. It did so for the sensible purpose of reducing fraudulent signatures. The provision, however, runs afoul of the First Amendment because it creates a significant burden on a core political speech right that is not narrowly tailored. Accordingly, we affirm the district court?s grant of summary judgment against the State.

RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. This case arises from an incident in which Detroit police officers Emmett Quaine and Juan Reynoso, Jr. opened fire on Ronald Floyd in his own backyard, wounding him in the chest. Floyd, who was unarmed, claims that the officers fired on him without warning and without cause. He filed this lawsuit, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the City of Detroit and the two officers. According to Floyd, the officers violated his constitutional rights by using excessive force, and the City is liable for failing to properly train them. All three defendants filed a joint motion for summary judgment.

DENISE PAGE HOOD, District Judge. Appellant Willie J. Jackson (?Jackson?) filed a complaint against FedEx Corporate Services, Inc. and Federal Express Corporation (collectively ?FedEx?) alleging he was discriminated against based on his race in violation of The Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 as amended (?Section 1981?), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq. (?Title VII?) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (?ADEA?), 29 U.S.C. 621 et. seq. The district court dismissed Jackson?s ADEA claim and Jackson does not appeal that decision. The district court denied FedEx?s Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to Jackson?s claims under Section 1981 and Title VII. Following the close of Jackson?s evidence, the district court granted FedEx?s motion, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50, to dismiss Jackson?s case. For the reasons set forth below, the district court?s order is reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

SUTTON, Circuit Judge. There is a little more to this dispute than the topic (attorney?s fees) and the amount at stake (less than $15,000) would suggest. Larry Day says that the Benefits Review Board erred in determining that a portion of the fees he incurred in seeking workers? compensation did not shift to his employer, James Marine, under the Longshore and Harbor Workers? Compensation Act. Because the Board correctly determined that the Act does not allow an employee to collect attorney?s fees incurred before the employer has rejected the employee?s claim, we affirm this aspect of the Board?s decision. But because the Act does allow?and indeed requires?fee shifting from the time the employer rejects the employee?s claim through the employee?s successful prosecution of that claim, we reverse the Board?s contrary ruling on this point.