Federal Judiciary

United States v. Ayers, No. 08-6286-cr (2d Cir. March 30, 2010) (found here)

Ayers was convicted of, and sentenced to ten years for, receipt of child pornography.  He appealed from an order modifying the conditions of his supervision to include polygraph and computerized voice-stress examinations.

In general, a district court may impose a special condition of supervised release so long as the condition: (1) is "reasonably relevant" to the nature of the offense and to the goals of deterrence, rehabilitation and public safety; (2) "involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary" to achieve those goals; and (3) "is consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission."  18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1)-(3).  Ayers didn't dispute that the supervised release conditions satisfy the first and third statutory requirements.  But he did contend that the condition violates the second because the district court's failure to prohibit the use of the examination results in any subsequent civil commitment proceeding under 18 U.S.C. § 4248 effects a greater deprivation of liberty than is warranted by the legitimate objects of supervision.

The Second Circuit disagreed.  Specifically, in determining whether a condition of supervised release imposes an unnecessary deprivation of liberty, it first "must identify the cognizable liberty interest with which the condition interferes."  And it found that the condition imposed on Ayers does not intrude on any cognizable liberty interest because the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment is limited to criminal cases.  Moreover, the Second Circuit found that "the use of supervised release testing results in civil commitment proceedings is hardly unrelated to the sentencing goals of deterrence, public safety, and rehabilitation, given the commitment statute's focus on (1) protecting the public from people who 'would have serious difficulty in refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation if released' . . . and (2) providing treatment for such people."