Federal Judiciary

RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. Cynthia Lambert appeals the district court?s dismissal of her complaint against Greg Hartmann in his official capacity as the Hamilton County Clerk of Courts (the ?Clerk?) and against the Hamilton County Board of County Commissioners (the ?County?) (collectively the ?Defendants?). In September of 2003, Lambert received a traffic citation for speeding. She later discovered that this citation, which contained personal identifying information (including her Social Security number), had been published on the Clerk?s public website.

Lambert sued the Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that the publication of the citation violated her constitutional right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. She further asserted that her identity had been stolen by a third party as a direct result of the Clerk?s publication of the citation, and that she had consequently suffered economic damages, damage to her personal credit rating, and damage to her reputation. Lambert also raised state-law claims and sought to certify her complaint as a class action.

The Defendants moved to dismiss Lambert?s complaint on the basis that she had failed to state a claim under § 1983. Concluding that Lambert?s § 1983 claim must fail because her alleged privacy interest was not of a constitutional dimension, the district court granted the Defendants? motion. The court then dismissed her pendent state-law claims without prejudice. Lambert argues that the court erred in dismissing her complaint and renews her claim that the Defendants violated her constitutional right to privacy. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. In January of 2005, Amanda Kistner received a collection letter from The Law Offices of Michael P. Margelefsky, LLC related to her Cincinnati Bell account. The letter, printed on The Law Offices of Michael P. Margelefsky letterhead, contains a block signature declaring that the letter was sent by an ?Account Representative.? Kistner subsequently filed the present lawsuit as a putative class action against The Law Offices of Michael P. Margelefsky (the Law Offices) and Michael Margelefsky individually, alleging numerous violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, and the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act (OCSPA), Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1345.01.

The district court granted summary judgment both to the Law Offices and to Margelefsky after concluding that the collection letter did not make any misrepresentations and was not deceptive. For the reasons set forth below, we REVERSE the judgment of the district court and REMAND the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Specifically, we conclude that Margelefsky can be held individually liable as a ?debt collector? under the FDCPA and that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the collection letter was deceptive.

SUTTON, Circuit Judge. Scott Eungard, a salesman, seeks commissions on products and services ordered by a client on the same day he was fired. Because ambiguity in Eungard?s compensation agreement precludes summary judgment for Open Solutions, we reverse and remand.

ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-Appellant Douglas B. Stalley (?Stalley?) filed seven separate lawsuits in the district courts in Tennessee ? in addition to numerous cases in other jurisdictions against different defendants ? claiming that Defendants-Appellees Methodist Healthcare (?Methodist?), Sumner Regional Health Systems, Inc. (?Sumner?), Erlanger Health System (?Erlanger?), Wellmont Health System (?Wellmont?), Mountain States Health Alliance (?Mountain States?), Covenant Health (?Covenant?), and The Baptist Health System of East Tennessee (?Baptist?)1 (collectively referred to as ?Appellees?) all violated the Medicare Secondary Payer Act (?MSP?), 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b). In none of the virtually identical complaints does Stalley allege any direct injury. Instead, the complaints are premised on his belief that the MSP is a qui tam statute granting him standing to sue as a private attorney general. The several district courts, following the clear language of the MSP and a plethora of case law, separately ruled that the MSP is not a qui tam statute and, therefore, Stalley does not have Article III standing to raise these claims. Stalley appeals those decisions. Because we find no basis upon which to hold that the MSP is a qui tam statute, and no basis upon which to find that Stalley can otherwise demonstrate standing, we AFFIRM the judgments of the district courts.