Federal Judiciary

David Raposa (?Plaintiff?) commenced this civil action to appeal the Commissioner's denial of disability benefits. This court entered a judgment that reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Soon afterward, the court granted Plaintiff's motion for fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (?EAJA?) and awarded $3,618.75.

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With respect to the substance of the motion, Plaintiff signed a contingency fee agreement to pay 25% of any past due benefits awarded. That agreement may provide the amount of the Section 406(b) award so long as the amount is reasonable under the facts of the case. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 1828 (2002). In the Fifth Circuit, Section 406(b) is construed to limit the combined amount of attorney fees awarded by the agency under Section 406(a) and by the court under Section 406(b) to a total of 25% of the past due benefits. Dawson v. Finch, 425 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir.1970). ^FN1 Thus, the court must take into consideration any amount awarded by the agency.

FN1. There is a circuit split on this issue, with some courts holding that a court may award an amount equal to 25% of past due benefits, irrespective of any amount awarded by the agency under Section 406(a). See Clark v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir.2008) (describing the split).

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