Legal Commentary

The Madman Theory Of Political Bargaining: Part 3

By Big Tent Democrat

Below, Jeralyn discusses the reports of a split bill on health care reform. On that issue, Matt Yglesias writes:

[I]t’s a good idea. Still, it is worth emphasizing that no level of procedural cleverness can substitute for actual desire to pass legislation. If moderate Democratic senators just don’t want to cast a “yes” vote in favor of progressive health legislation, this lets them have their way and still pass a good bill. But if Max Baucus and Kent Conrad are actually fanatically devoted to defending the interests of the for-profit health care industry, then he can find ways to make this not work.

(Emphasis supplied.) Matt is missing a key player in this bargaining - the Progressive Block in the House. If the Progressive Block stands firm in saying no to health care reform without a public option (meaning no vote on the non-public option half of this split without a vote on the public option half)) - if they demonstrate they will walk away, then Max Baucus and Kent Conrad do not have the only veto in this. Moreover, there is no reason for Baucus and Conrad to have such a veto anyway - reconciliation means just that - it takes 50 (plus Biden's tiebreaker.) Unless Baucus and Co. round up 11 Dem votes, they can't veto a thing.

My previous posts on the madman theory of political bargaining here and here.UPDATE - Kevin Drum explains the obvious to Ezra Klein - "the point is probably to protect centrist Democrats. They can vote against Bill #1 and for Bill #2 . . ."

Speaking for me only

Full post as published by TalkLeft on August 20, 2009 (boomark / email).