Legal News

U.S. Supreme Court Establishes New Standard for Judicial Recusal

By Brian Harris

On June 8, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. Inc., establishing a new standard for judicial recusal. In 2002, a West Virginia jury found A.T. Massey Coal Co. liable to Hugh Caperton and others on fraudulent misrepresentation and other claims, awarding $50 million in compensatory and punitive damages. In anticipation of Massey?s appeal to the state Supreme Court, Don Blankenship, Massey?s chairman, threw his financial support behind Brent Benjamin, an attorney running for a seat on that court in West Virginia?s 2004 judicial elections, contributing more than $3 million to Benjamin?s campaign. Blankenship?s contributions exceeded the total contributions by all other Benjamin supporters combined, and were three times as much as Benjamin?s own campaign committee spent, helping Benjamin win the election with 53.3 percent of the vote.

On appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court reversed the $50 million verdict against Massey in a 3-2 decision. Caperton moved for rehearing and for Benjamin?s recusal three times. Each time, the court affirmed the reversal of the verdict and each time Benjamin denied the motion for recusal on the grounds that there was no objective evidence that he was biased.

The U.S. Supreme Court considered whether Benjamin?s failure to recuse himself violated the Due Process Clause. In a 5-4 opinion authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the court reversed the West Virginia Supreme Court?s decision. The court noted that historically a court could find a constitutionally unacceptable bias sufficient to invoke the Due Process Clause in very limited circumstances typically involving the judge?s personal interest in the case. In those instances, the Supreme Court noted that the inquiry regarding the necessity for recusal must be objective ? a court must not inquire into whether a judge was actually biased for some reason, but rather whether the average judge in that position is likely to be biased.

On those grounds, the court rejected Massey?s argument that Benjamin?s reason for denying the recusal motions ? that Benjamin?s own analysis concluded that Caperton could not provide any objective evidence that Benjamin was actually biased ? was correct. The court noted that judges are asked every day to consider the existence of their own personal bias. It is because of the frequency and the complexity of such self-analysis that an objective standard is required. The court agreed with Caperton?s argument ? that the extraordinary nature of Blankenship?s financial contributions to Benjamin?s campaign created a constitutionally intolerable ?probability of bias.? While Benjamin would not realize a direct, personal financial gain, the court decided he would certainly feel a ?debt of gratitude? to Blankenship and Massey. Considering the size of the contribution and its likely effect on the election outcome, the court held that Benjamin had a duty to recuse himself.

Chief Justice John Roberts issued a blistering dissent, joined by Justice Antonin Scalia, Justice Clarence Thomas and Justice Samuel Alito. The dissent noted that the majority had introduced new grounds for recusal ? ?probability of bias? ? that would prove virtually impossible to limit in any meaningful way. The dissent noted that the majority opinion would require judges to act as political scientists, economists and psychologists in determining the degree to which campaign contributions affected the outcome of a campaign. Thus, the dissent argued, ?the cure is worse than the disease? in that the new standard would increase the number of recusal motions, leading to further erosion of public confidence in judicial impartiality ? the very ideal the majority claimed its holding was meant to protect.

Ryan J. Fleming, a member of Stradley Ronon Stevens & Young's employment and labor practice group, focuses on employment litigation including discrimination and wrongful discharge claims and counsels employers on a variety of employment-related issues.

Blog postings are not legal advice and do not create an attorney-client relationship. Materials posted here represent the views of the poster or commenter and not the views of Stradley Ronon Stevens & Young, LLP or its clients.

Ryan J. Fleming
Stradley Ronon Stevens & Young, LLP
rfleming@stradley.com
www.stradley.com

Full post as published by The Legal Intelligencer Blog on June 26, 2009 (boomark / email).