Patent Law

Brill argues for stronger inequitable conduct penalties

By Lawrence B. Ebert, Esq.

Congress, engaged in an ambitious process to reform the patent system in the U.S., is contemplating changing the rules with regard to inequitable conduct. Shockingly, however, they are being asked to weaken, not strengthen, the deterrent against fraud. Opponents of current law--companies holding complex but valuable patents--claim that inequitable conduct is asserted too freely and the cost of defending themselves against false claims of lying and cheating are too great. They also claim that rendering a patent unenforceable is too severe a punishment for firms found to have deceived the PTO.

But as is the case with executives who lie to the SEC, forceful punishment is the best deterrent against fraud at the PTO. A strong deterrent is necessary to produce confidence in the entire patent system so that investors are willing to risk their capital to develop new innovations. In fact, losing protection for one's patents may be an inadequate deterrent in many circumstances, such as when it occurs near the end of a patent's life.

Elsewhere: And the ability to entice investors to back new science discoveries depends on a system that discourages scientists from being cheats.

Of course, one wonders about the scientific cheats that publish in the journal Science, such as Jan Hendrik Schon and Hwang Woo Suk, and thereby entice investors.

Full post as published by IPBiz on June 02, 2009 (boomark / email).