Academic

The dialogue touches on the nature of liberty. The argument posited: liberty is grounded on the power to act ("Liberty, then, is nothing but the power of doing what I will" Id., at 485). Yet it is unconnected to any power to will the action ("How! am I not at liberty to will what I will?" Id.). The answer is no. Liberty is essentially the power and freedom to act:

At this rate, my greyhound is as free as I am. He has necessarily a will to run at the sight of a hare, and likewise the power of running, if not lame: so that, in nothing am I superior to my dog. This is leveling me with the beasts. Id., at 485

Friend: I mean that I have the liberty of willing as I please.
Philosopher: By your leave, there is no sense in that. Do you not perceive, that it is ridiculous to say, I will will. You will necessarily in consequence of the ideas occurring to you. Id., at 486

And thus, the Philosopher ends, "Your will is not free, but your actions are. You are free to act, when you have the power of acting." Id., at 486.

And yet the law is based on the inverse premise. People are accorded a liberty to will, but are absolutely constrained to act. The law of religious tolerance in the United States, for example, is grounded on this inversion. See Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (the state may not interfere with belief but may regulate conduct). Yet, if the will is constrained, and the only liberty is that of action, then, the law effects a double bind--suggesting a liberty where none exists and positing a range of constraint in the only sphere in which liberty may be effectively asserted. The Iraqi Constitution provides a similar constraint, protecting a sphere of belief and a limited tolerance fo religious rites ("This Constitution guarantees the Islamic identity of the majority of the Iraqi people and guarantees the full religious rights of all individuals to freedom of religious belief and practice such as Christians, Yazedis, and Mandi Sabeans." Iraqi Constitution Art. 2).

And yet, this inversion may serve the project of law well, when understood as the most visible manifestation of communal power over individual liberty For might it not be logical for a state to seek to control only those aspects of the human experience where an individual may assert some liberty, and protect an individual in the preservation of a will over which there is no control. In this sense, law can be understood principally as a mechanism for constraining, not preserving, liberty.