Real Estate & Property Law

New York Court Of Appeals To Hear Appeal Challenging Reason For Taking

By Robert Thomas (inversecondemnation.com)

Thanks to Professor Patty Salkin's Law of the Land blog for letting us know that on January 14, 2009, the New York Court of Appeals (that state's highest court) will be hearing oral arguments in Aspen Creek Estates, Ltd. v. Town of Brookhaven, a case challenging a municipality's ability to take property.  Professor Salkin summarizes the issues in the case here. 

In the opinion now under review, the Appellate Divison approved a taking of private property to preserve it as farmland.  The court's majority held that the goal of preserving farmland generally qualifies as a public use/purpose, and that there was no evidence of pretext in the record demonstrating that the presumption of public use should be questioned, even though the property owner asserted that the land would eventually be leased or sold to another private owner.

The property owner also asserted that because the taking was not part of a plan, it did not deserve judicial deference.  Recall that in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), the majority took great pains to establish that the taking of Mrs. Kelo's house was part of a "'carefully considered' development plan," and was therefore entitled to judicial deference.  Kelo reviewed the decision to take property by eminent domain in much the same fashion that the courts review police power zoning decisions under due process analysis: courts wash their hands for the most part as long as the zoning is enacted "in accordance with a comprehensive plan."  This aspect of the Kelo decision has received some attention, but little traction so far.  See, e.g., MiPro Homes, L.L.C. v. Mount Laurel Township, 878 A.2d 38 (N.J. Super. 2005), aff'd 910 A.2d 617 (N.J.) (per curiam), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___ (2007); Western Seafood Co. v. United States, No 04-41196 (5th Cir., Oct. 11, 2006). 

The Appellate Divison in Aspen Creek wasn't bothered at all by the utter lack of a formal (or even an informal) plan, Kelo's "carefully considered" language notwithstanding.  The court simply implied one:

In any event, while it does not appear from the record that the precise boundaries of the Manorville Farmland Protection Area [the alleged "plan"] have been carefully considered by the Town, it is clear from the comments made by various speakers at the hearing that the desirability of preserving farmland in Manorville has indeed been recognized by civic associations and public officials.  A plan prepared by the Manorville Taxpayers Association in 1993 set preservation of the remaining farms in the hamlet as a goal. . . .

Slip op. at 6.  So let's see if I get this straight. There was no plan to preserve farmland, but since someone "commented" at a public hearing that preserving farmland is desirable, the court is free to imply that a plan not only exists, but that it is "carefully considered" and therefore due judicial deference?  Is is highly doubtful that a plan by civic groups gleaned from comments at a public hearing is the kind of comprehensive action the majority had in mind in Kelo.  The fact that a condemnation takes place within the context of a comprehensive plan is, in theory, designed to give the courts confidence in the result, but if an action takes place without a plan, courts should be more willing to give it a hard look, as in cases of "spot zoning," for example. 

A second point is also spurred by the above quote.  If the implied plan to take property to preserve farmland has been in existence since 1993, then the just compensation awarded to the property owner should take into account the rise in value from that date to the time of the taking, since the so-called "plan" has blighted the property since 1993.

The Appellate Division's opinion was squarely at odds with a decision by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued 24 days later, Middletown Township v. The Lands of Josef Seegar Stone, No 64 MAP 2006 (Dec. 28, 2007), a decision we analyzed here. In that case, the court struck down an attempted taking of property for farmland because it was a pretext to hide the "true purpose" of the taking for recreational purposes. 

Full post as published by inversecondemnation on January 12, 2009 (boomark / email).