Appellate Law

CA1: 1983 challenges to hearing officer due process hearing cognizable, but not meritorious

By S. COTUS

Chmielinski v. Commonwealth of MA, No. 07-1652, rejects the argument that a Chief Probation Officer (in Massachusetts, probation is part of the judiciary) was fired without due process. 

The First holds that despite the fact that he worked for the judiciary, these claims can be heard in a 1983 context, because, (duh), the court was acting as an employer and not a judicial body.  Therefore, ?The Trial Court's decision to terminate Chmielinski was the result of an administrative proceeding held in its capacity as an employer, and was not the "final judgment[] of a state court in [a] judicial proceeding[]." ... [and] ... the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which bars lower federal courts from reviewing the decisions of state courts, does not apply to the state court's decision.?  Moreover, exhaustion isn?t an issue because, well, the Supreme Court said it wasn?t, in Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982).

I bet you want to keep reading.

Next, the First holds that the Parratt-Hudson doctrine doesn?t apply because there were not any specific regulations or statutes specifying the type of hearing that he was entitled to. 

However, what really matters is whether the hearing complied with due process.  The First concludes, that, yes, he had notice, and he wasn?t really entitled to pre-hearing discovery or that witnesses be sworn and sequestered.  The First does make this analysis on the facts, stating that because the plaintiff was in control over whatever ?facts? (i.e. he had knowledge) he sought discovery of there really isn?t prejudice.

Finally, the First holds that the hearing officer wasn?t biased.

Full post as published by Appellate Law and Practice on January 22, 2008 (boomark / email).