Legal News

Landmark decision from Supreme Court

By Glen Ashman

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ARIZONA v. GANT (No. 07-542)

Web-accessible at:
    http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/07-542.ZS.html

 Argued: October 7, 2008 -- Decided: April 21, 2009
Opinion author: Stevens
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  Respondent Gant was arrested for driving on a suspended
license, handcuffed, and locked in a patrol car before
officers searched his car and found cocaine in a jacket
pocket. The Arizona trial court denied his motion to suppress
the evidence, and he was convicted of drug offenses. Reversing,
the State Supreme Court distinguished New York v. Belton,
453 U. S. 454 --which held that police may search the passenger
compartment of a vehicle and any containers therein as
a contemporaneous incident of a recent occupant's lawful
arrest--on the ground that it concerned the scope of a
search incident to arrest but did not answer the question
whether officers may conduct such a search once the scene
has been secured. Because Chimel v. California, 395 U.
S. 752 , requires that a search incident to arrest be justified
by either the interest in officer safety or the interest
in preserving evidence and the circumstances of Gant's
arrest implicated neither of those interests, the State
Supreme Court found the search unreasonable.


  Held: Police may search the passenger compartment of a
vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only if
it is reasonable to believe that the arrestee might access
the vehicle at the time of the search or that the vehicle
contains evidence of the offense of arrest. Pp. 5-18.


  (a) Warrantless searches "are per se unreasonable," "subject
only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 . The
exception for a search incident to a lawful arrest applies
only to "the area from within which [an arrestee] might
gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence."
Chimel, 395 U. S., at 763. This Court applied that exception
to the automobile context in Belton, the holding of which
rested in large part on the assumption that articles inside
a vehicle's passenger compartment are "generally ... within
'the area into which an arrestee might reach.' " 453 U.
S., at 460. Pp. 5-8.


  (b) This Court rejects a broad reading of Belton that would
permit a vehicle search incident to a recent occupant's
arrest even if there were no possibility the arrestee could
gain access to the vehicle at the time of the search. The
safety and evidentiary justifications underlying Chimel's
exception authorize a vehicle search only when there is
a reasonable possibility of such access. Although it does
not follow from Chimel, circumstances unique to the automobile
context also justify a search incident to a lawful arrest
when it is "reasonable to believe evidence relevant to
the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle." Thornton
v. United States, 541 U. S. 615 (Scalia, J., concurring
in judgment). Neither Chimel's reaching-distance rule nor
Thornton's allowance for evidentiary searches authorized
the search in this case. In contrast to Belton, which involved
a single officer confronted with four unsecured arrestees,
five officers handcuffed and secured Gant and the two other
suspects in separate patrol cars before the search began.
Gant clearly could not have accessed his car at the time
of the search. An evidentiary basis for the search was
also lacking. Belton and Thornton were both arrested for
drug offenses, but Gant was arrested for driving with a
suspended license--an offense for which police could not
reasonably expect to find evidence in Gant's car. Cf. Knowles
v. Iowa, 525 U. S. 113 . The search in this case was therefore
unreasonable. Pp. 8-11.


  (c) This Court is unpersuaded by the State's argument that
its expansive reading of Belton correctly balances law
enforcement interests with an arrestee's limited privacy
interest in his vehicle. The State seriously undervalues
the privacy interests at stake, and it exaggerates both
the clarity provided by a broad reading of Belton and its
importance to law enforcement interests. A narrow reading
of Belton and Thornton,together with this Court's other
Fourth Amendment decisions, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463
U. S. 103 , and United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798 ,
permit an officer to search a vehicle when safety or evidentiary
concerns demand. Pp. 11-14.


  (d) Stare decisis does not require adherence to a broad
reading of Belton. The experience of the 28 years since
Belton has shown that the generalization underpinning the
broad reading of that decision is unfounded, and blind
adherence to its faulty assumption would authorize myriad
unconstitutional searches. Pp. 15-18.


  216 Ariz. 1, 162 P. 3d 640, affirmed.


  Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Scalia,
J., filed a concurring opinion. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting
opinion. Alito, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy, J., joined, and in which Breyer,
J., joined except as to Part II-E.

Full post as published by It's (Barely) Legal on April 22, 2009 (boomark / email).