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: The Legal ScoopCircuit Split: Cat's Paw Liability
By Scott Felsenthal et al.
Attorneys in the field of employment law, especially those working in multiple jurisdictions, are at a loss to explain the Supreme Court's recent dismissal of the EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling of Los Angeles case, to which they had originally granted certiori. EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles, 450 F.3d 476, 485 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. dismissed, 127 S. Ct 1931 (2007). The primary question before the Court was under what circumstances an employer may be held liable for the discriminatory animus/actions of a subordinate when the decisionmaker lacked any such animus.
The term "Cat's Paw" liability was coined by Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit in Sharger v. Upjohn Co. in 1990. 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990). The reference is to Jean de La Fontaine's famous fable of the monkey and the cat. In the fable, a crafty monkey wants to eat a batch of hot chestnuts that are sitting in the fire. Unwilling to burn his own hand, he convinces the cat to reach his paw in and pull the chestnuts out for him. The cat ignorantly does his bidding, and the money enjoys the chestnuts with a laugh while the cat suffers the severe burns to his paw.
In the world of employment law, "Cat's Paw" is a representation of "Subordinate Bias Liability" and the circuits vary widely on just how to define the parameters of the doctrine.
Your typical subordinate bias case involves a manager or supervisor who has a discriminatory animus towards one of his subordinates (who is protected by Title VII, ADEA, ADA, etc.), but the supervisor lacks the ability to hire, fire, promote, demote, or otherwise take action against the employee. What the supervisor may do is manipulate the personnel file of the employee, make false negative reports, or recommend that the human resources department (or another group with proper decision making authority) review the file and take action. A lot of larger corporations have a problem when the decision makers are isolated from the rest of the employees, because the HR person who ultimately fires the employee might not even be aware that the employee was a member of a protected class.
Thus, the actual decision to terminate the protected employee was innoncent, in the sense that the decisonmaker himself did not harbor any illegal motive. The problem is that courts accept this practice as proper under civil rights and employment laws, employers can shelter themselves from liability simply by consolidating decision making authority and isolating those decision makers from the rest of the employees. Such a paradox is clearly contrary to the goals of Title VII, and thus - in varying forms - courts have adopted standards of assigning liability to the employer in these situations.
One of the primary means for an employer to escape liability is to demonstrate that the decisionmaker undertook an investigation and made an independent decision about whether or not to terminate the employee. One debate is whether the courts should be concerned with the "adequacy" of the investigation, as it is generally not the role of the judiciary to sit as super-personnel departments, second-guessing the personnel decisions of an employer.
If the employer merely utilized the reports provided by the bias subordinate, they become the "cat's paw" and the crafty supervisor - though lacking true authority - is able to exercise official (and discriminatory) power over the employee. The term "rubber stamp" is often used when the biased subordinate makes an official recommendation which is blindly approved by the decision makers. In such an instance, the company - through its actions - rubber stamps the discrimination and is thus liable for it.
There are essentially three standards that have been adopted, which I have coined (1) lenient; (2) intermediate; and (3) strict. The lenient standard was first proffered by the Seventh Circuit in the years following the Sharger decision.
Generally, under the lenient standard (the most employee friendly), liability may be imputed to an employer when ?an employee with discriminatory animus provided factual information that may have affected the adverse employment action.? This standard sets a very low threshold for an employee to meet. In such a scenario, a single tainted report by a single discriminatory manager in a personnel file may be sufficient to justify the imputation of liability to the employer. As the Tenth Circuit pointed out in BCI Coca-Cola, this standard ?weakens the deterrent effect of subordinate bias claims by imposing liability even where an employer has diligently conducted an independent investigation.?
Congress? overarching goal when drafting Title VII was to encourage the creation of responsible employment practices and policies that identify and eliminate discrimination. Because the lenient standard allows employees to recover even if an employer has complied with Title VII, the employer?s incentive to aggressively identify and eliminate discrimination through responsible company policies and structure is significantly diminished. Such a result is directly contrary to the objectives of Title VII. Courts should not endorse any standard of imputing liability that creates such a paradox, because to do so would cause severe detriment to employers and employees alike. Yet it is some variation on this standard that most circuits have adopted.Other generally "lenient" approaches:The intermediate standard was articulated by the Tenth Circuit in BCI Coca-Cola. The biased subordinate must have "more than mere influence" however, rather than focusing on the level of influence the supervisor had, the court focused on whether the biased subordinate?s discriminatory reports, recommendations, or other actions caused the adverse employment action. The problem with this standard is that the discussion quickly digresses into a debate over the "adequacy" of the investigation undertaken by the HR professionals before they made their decision. As noted above, such is not the role of the court. There has been a great deal of discussion about "causation" since the BCI Coca-Cola decision came down, and commentators have expressed a great deal of concern over the intermediate standard:
7th ? ?an employee with discriminatory animus provided factual information or other input that may have affected the adverse employment action? Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1459 (7th Cir. 1994) 5th ? Employee must show that the supervisor had ?influence or leverage over the official decisionmaker? Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 226 (5th Cir. 2000) 3rd ? ?a discriminatory evaluation at any level influenced the decisionmaking process and thus allowed the discrimination to infect the ultimate decision.? Abramson v. William Patterson College of New Jersey, 260 F.3d 265 (3rd Cir. 2001) 9th ? ?when the decisionmaker . . . takes an adverse employment action in reliance on factors affected by another decisionmaker?s discriminatory animus? Galdamez v. Potter, 415 F.3d 1015, 1026 n. 9 (9th Cir.2005) 6th ? ?those who did not independently have the authority or did not directly exercise their authority to fire the plaintiff, but who nevertheless played a meaningful role in the decision.? Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 354-55 (6th Cir.1998) 11th ? the decisionmaker followed the biased recommendation without independently investigating the complaint against the employee. Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir.1999) 8th ? ?An employer cannot escape responsibility for discrimination . . ., when the facts on which the reviewers rely have been filtered by a manager [acting discriminatorily]? Stacks v. S.W. Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 27 F.3d 1316, 1323 (8th Cir.1994).
?This middle ground approach . . . created even greater uncertainty for employers ascertaining (i) their liability exposure for the biased acts of subordinate employees, and (ii) the depth of the investigation required to defeat potential subordinate bias in ?cat?s paw? claims.? Angelo J. Genova & Francis J. Vernoia, Practical Considerations from Recent Development in Employment Law, 759 Prac. L. Inst./Litig. 9, 21 (2007).
The final standard is the strict (most employer friendly) standard, adopted by the Fourth Circuit in Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Corp., 354 F.3d 277 (4th Cir. 2004). This standard is "truest" to the cat's paw analogy. It requires that the biased subordinate be "principally responsible" for the adverse employment action, or act as the "actual decisionmaker" when the circumstances are objectively evaluated. While this does articulate a manner in which Title VII liability ought be imputed to an employer, it is too narrow to sufficiently protect the interests of employee's because the bar is too high to be met in most cases. Because the standard is so narrow, it has been widely rejected by commentators and other courts.
As you can see, there are three distinct approaches that are being taken by the Circuit Courts today, and the result is that employers are left guessing about whether their Title VII compliance mechanisms are of value and when they might be subjected to liability for the covert actions of a rogue employee. The Supreme Court has punted the issue for now, but it will undoubtedly be addressed in the coming years.
Full post as published by The Legal Scoop on January 29, 2008 (boomark / email).
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