Consumer Law

The Law and Economics of Subprime Lending

By Deepak Gupta

Todd Zywicki and Joseph Adamson of George Mason have a new article at SSRN offering a conservative law-and-economics take on the subprime mortgage lending crisis. After a lot of back and forth, the paper's basic point is that policymakers shouldn't do anything in response to the current crisis until we know much more about how to "balance the cost and benefits" of subprime lending. Here's their abstract:

The collapse of the subprime mortgage market has led to calls for greater regulation to protect homeowners from unwittingly trapping themselves in high-cost loans that lead to foreclosure, bankruptcy, or other financial problems. Weighed against this catastrophe are the benefits that have accrued to millions of American families who have been able to become homeowners who otherwise would not have access to mortgage credit. Although the bust of the subprime mortgage market has resulted in high levels of foreclosures and even problems on Wall Street, the boom generated unprecedented levels of homeownership, especially among young, low-income, and minority borrowers, putting them on a road to economic comfort and stability. Sensible regulation of subprime lending should seek to curb abusive practices while preserving these benefits.

This article reviews the theories and evidence regarding the causes of the turmoil in the subprime market. It then turns to the question of the rising foreclosures in that market in order to understand the causes of rising foreclosures. In particular, we examine the competing models of home foreclosures that have been developed in the economics literature - the "distress" model and the "option" model. Establishing a correct model of the causes of foreclosure in the subprime market is necessary for sensible and effective policy responses to the problem. Finally, we review some of the policy initiatives that have been suggested in response to the crisis in the subprime market. Because new regulatory interventions will have costs as well as benefits, until the causes of the market?s problems are better understood it may be that the best policy in the short-term is to do little until well-tailored regulatory approaches are available.

Full post as published by CL&P Blog on March 19, 2008 (boomark / email).