Academic

Orbach & Sjorberg on Backyard Chickens

By Lawrence Solum

Barak Y. Orbach and Frances R. Sjoberg (University of Arizona and University of Arizona - James E. Rogers College of Law) have posted Debating Over Backyard Chickens on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

This paper supplements our Article, The Clucking Theorem: Legal Transitions, Civility Norms, and Social Costs. The paper documents the debates and controversies over backyard chicken laws in 40 localities between 2007 and 2010. The paper also examines relevant legal transitions in three states. The Clucking Theorem is available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1740625.

And here is the abstract for the prior paper:

This Article introduces The Clucking Theorem, which states that human nature unnecessarily inflates the costs of processes related to proposed legal changes. Clucking is a form of externality - it is an action that inflates the social costs associated with discourse over a new or revised norm. It also alters transitions, degrades the quality of reforms, impedes certain changes, and facilitates undesirable transitions. Our inquiry into the characteristics of clucking is supported by a qualitative study of debates and disputes over changes to backyard chicken laws in more than one hundred localities between 2007 and 2010. This study emphasizes that certain clucking characteristics are unrelated to the significance of the issue at stake, the size of the population, or the innovation in the proposed change. In synthesizing the study, we identify five categories of individuals who engage in clucking: (1) losers, (2) winners, (3) status-quo enforcers, (4) political opportunists, and (5) human roosters. Finally, we suggest that civility norms and procedural rules are viable means to reduce the social costs of clucking.

Full post as published by Legal Theory Blog on January 21, 2011 (boomark / email).