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Final administrative determination for the purposes of determining the statute of limitations

Final administrative determination for the purposes of determining the statute of limitations
Skiptunas v State of New York, App. Div., 3rd Dept, 290 A.D.2d 868

The Court of Claims Act allows an individual to sue the State, provided he or she files a timely notice of claim or a notice of intention to file a claim. Such a claim or notice of claim must be filed within 90 days from the accrual date of the claim. In Skiptunas, the Appellate Division found that Charles P. Skiptunas did not file either his claim or his notice of his intention to file a claim within the time limits set out in the Court of Claims Act, which begins to run from date of a final administrative decision.

According to the decision, in October 1994, the Middletown City School District investi­gated a complaint that a probationary teacher had engaged in an inappropriate personal relationship with a student. After the District determined that there was an improper, nonsexual, relationship, the teacher chose to resign from his position rather than be terminated.

On November 7, 1995, the District's Superintendent, Charles P. Skiptunas, reported this event to the Education Department's professional conduct office. Following an investiga­tion by the Department, a charge was filed against Skiptunas alleging that he failed to promptly report the investigation conducted by the District and the circumstances under­lying the teacher's resignation as required by the Commissioner's Regulations [8 NYCRR 83].

The charge against Skiptunas was released by the Department of Education and reported in several newspapers. On October 22, 1996, a three-member Hearing Panel issued its final determination. It found that the Department did not meet its burden of proof and its allegations did not raise any questions about Skiptunas's moral character. The Panel recommended that the charge be dismissed. The Commissioner of Education adopted the Panel's recommendation.

The Commissioner later issued a memorandum dated December 16, 1996 to all school superintendents reminding them of their duty to file timely 8 NYCRR 83 reports and indicating his concern that the Panel's ruling in Skiptunas' case might "send the wrong message" to them, i.e., that simply removing a problem teacher from a district is sufficient to fulfill all legal obligations.

Skiptunas' attorney objected to the Commissioner's memorandum, contending that it appeared to imply that Skiptunas was guilty of an impropriety and asked the Commis­sioner issue a specific order terminating the proceeding against Skiptunas. The Commis­sioner replied that as he accepted the Hearing Panel's findings, there was no need for issuance of a separate order.

Skiptunas sued in Federal court, only to have his lawsuit against the Commissioner and others was dismissed on the ground that the defendants were entitled to a qualified immunity. When the Federal court declined to exercise jurisdiction over Skiptunas' State claims, he filed an action in the Court of Claims seeking damages for alleged malicious prosecution, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Court of Claims dismissed his action as untimely and Skiptunas appealed this ruling to the Ap­pellate Division.

In his appeal Skiptunas conceded that he did not file a formal notice of his intention to file a claim at any point. However, he argued, he "substantially complied" with the notice of claim requirement in his May 27, 1998 letter asking the Commissioner "bring public closure to the charges against him".

The Appellate Division disagreed with Skiptunas' theory, ruling that his law suit princip­ally challenged the commencement and investigation of the charges brought against him in January 1996, all of which culminated in the October 22, 1996 recommendation by the Panel to dismiss all charges.

Thus, said the court, the latest possible date on which Skiptunas' claim could have ac­crued was December 16, 1996, the date of the Commissioner's memorandum to the superintendents of schools concerning the Panel's decision. As Skiptunas did not send a letter of complaint until May 1998, the Appellate Division said that Court of Claims correctly found that Skiptunas did not meet the filing and service requirements of the Court of Claims Act.

Full post as published by New York Public Personnel Law on June 10, 2010 (boomark / email).