Federal Judiciary

United States v. Dugan, No. 09-1111-cr (2d Cir. April 22, 2010) (found here)

As noted in this blog's discussion of  United States v. Gonzalez, No. 09-1285-cr (2d Cir. April 6, 2010) (which can be found here) and United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2008), there is a relationship between procedural and substantive reasonableness review. 

The Cavera court noted that it will set aside a district court's substantive determination only in exception cases where the trial court's decision cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.  But it also explained that this this "degree of deference is only warranted" when the Second Circuit is "satisfied that the district court complied with the Sentencing Reform Act's procedural requirements."  And the Gonzalez court found that "If we determine that the sentence is procedurally reasonable, we then turn to its substantive unreasonableness." 

The developing relationship is confirmed -- I believe -- by one line in Dugan, in which the Second Circuit states that: "The substantive reasonableness of the defendant's sentence is reinforced by our further conclusion that, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the defendant's sentence is not procedurally unreasonable."

Is my theory correct here?