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Prior to the preliminary hearing, Jones filed a pro se motion to to represent himself. At the preliminary hearing, Jones asked the court, "How can you deny me my rights to represent myself? This is my right under the Sixth Amendment." The court disagreed and denied Jones' motion because the court believed that Jones' lack of legal training made him incompetent to represent himself (even though Jones had been declared competent to stand trial). Thus, Jones was represented by his appointed counsel at the preliminary hearing.

Prior to trial, a different judge conducted a renewed hearing on Jones' motion to represent himself. After a lengthy colloquy, Jones decided to allow his court-appointed attorney to represent him in the rest of the proceedings.

On appeal, Jones argued that his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation was violated when the district court denied his motion to represent himself at the preliminary hearing. The KSC agreed, noting that the preliminary hearing was a critical stage in the proceedings, and that Jones' "right to represent himself was as vested at the hearing as it was at trial." The court also refused to engage in harmless error analysis. The court noted that, "[a] violation of a Sixth Amendment right to counsel is subject to structural error analysis." The court stated:

The decision in this case is a good reminder that some constitutional violations are not subject to harmless error analysis because they "affect[] the framework within which the trial proceeds." See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-10, 113 L. Ed. 2d 302, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991).

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