New York

The Appellate Division, Third Department in Albarado v. Dillon recently addressed one of the defendant's claims of juror confusion.  The appeal concerned a three-car accident stemming from the defendant State Trooper's high-speed chase.  The other defendant was stopped on the same route, attempting to make a left-hand turn.  In attempting to avoid the defendant stopped in front of him, the defendant State Trooper first collided with the plaintiff Flood's vehicle and then, as the patrol car rolled over, with the plaintiff Alvarado's vehicle.

The appeal concerned plaintiff Alvarado's action against the State Trooper, the other defendant, and the plaintiff Flood.  A jury found the State Trooper liable to the plaintiff Alvarado and the plaintiff Flood; it found the other plaintiff not liable.

The State Trooper contended that the jury charge at trial to determine liability regarding the standard of care owed by him (as an on-duty police officer) was confusing and warranted a new trial.  The Third Department rejected the argument that the trial court should have given a more complete instruction.  

The Court held: "While the statutory language may be confusing standing alone . . ., the court did not rely solely on the statute in its charge to the jury.  After reading the statute, the court went on to give a charge that closely mirrored Pattern Jury Instruction 2:79a and, on multiple occasions during its charge, referenced the fact that [the defendant State Trooper and the other defendant] were to be judged by different standards . . . .  Additionally, the verdict sheet very clearly indicated these differing standards.  Furthermore, there is no tangible evidence that the jury was confused in this cse as it did not request a clarification on the instructions are.

The Court also addressed interesting points on review of unpreserved issues of fundamental error and costs of litigation under the CPLR.