Ethics

Article here; author's page.  I once had a civil rights lawyer speak to my students about what it was like to represent indigent African-Americans in rural southern courts where the judges weren't lawyers and were prejudiced.  The lawyer told us about the difficult choice between trying to get some kind of good result for the client or confronting the court openly about its prejudice.  Here's the abstract for Lahav's article:

This Article considers a question rarely addressed: what is the role of the lawyer in a manifestly unjust procedural regime? Many excellent studies have considered the role of the judge in unjust regimes, but the lawyer?s role has been largely ignored. This Article draws on two case studies: that of lawyers representing civil rights leaders during protests in Birmingham, Alabama in 1963 and that of lawyers representing detainees facing military commission proceedings in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. These portraits illuminate the role of the lawyer in a procedurally unjust tribunal operating within a larger liberal legal regime such as our own. 

The purpose of the Article is to paint a landscape of lawyer resistance to procedural injustice that can be used as a basis for further inquiry. The Article considers hard questions about lawyer participation in unjust tribunals such as whether lawyers who participate in unjust tribunals are complicit in injustice and what lawyers can do in the face of an unjust procedural regime. It presents a new way of understanding the forms of lawyer resistance to injustice. The Article demonstrates that complicity and resistance are not on opposite poles of human behavior within organizational systems. Rather, there is a dualistic interplay between complicity and resistance. Acts that appear to be resistance can be perceived as complicit, and acts that appear to be complicit can result in powerful forms of resistance. The Article also explores some questions raised by this analysis, such as what are the lawyer?s responsibilities to society and to his or her client and whether lawyers can know when a tribunal is so unjust as to merit resistance. It concludes by considering avenues for further research.