Intellectual Property Law

?No, You May Not Buy a Judge,? Supreme Court Rules

By Lee.Gesmer

?Turn it over, and turn it over, for all is therein.?

The Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Aboth, Ch. V, Mishnah 22 (I. Epstein ed. 1935), quoted in Justice Scalia’s dissent in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.

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In mid-March I wrote a post about the decision facing the Supreme Court in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.

The issue was whether a state court judge?s failure to recuse himself from a case in which he received substantial campaign donations from one of the parties violates the Due Process rights of the other party.

The Supreme Court issued a 5-4 decision today, holding that the judge’s failure to recuse in this case did violate the due process clause.

The majority decision was written by Justice Kennedy, who was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer.

Chief Justice Roberts dissented, joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas and Alito. Justice Scalia wrote a separate short dissent.

I am a great fan of unanswerable, hypothetical questions, so I quote the following “40 questions” from CJ Robert’s dissent. These questions are intended to show the extent to which the majority opinion has opened the field to collateral litigation over judicial disqualification:

1. How much money is too much money? What level of contribution or expenditure gives rise to a ?probability of bias??

2. How do we determine whether a given expenditure is?disproportionate?? Disproportionate to what?

3. Are independent, non-coordinated expenditures treated the same as direct contributions to a candidate?s campaign? What about contributions to independent side groups supporting a candidate?

4. Does it matter whether the litigant has contributed toother candidates or made large expenditures in connection
with other elections?

5. Does the amount at issue in the case matter? What if this case were an employment dispute with only$10,000 at stake? What if the plaintiffs only sought non-monetary relief such as an injunction or declaratory judgment?

6. Does the analysis change depending on whether the judge whose disqualification is sought sits on a trial court, appeals court, or state supreme court?

7. How long does the probability of bias last? Does the probability of bias diminish over time as the election recedes? Does it matter whether the judge plans to run for reelection?

8. What if the ?disproportionately? large expenditure is made by an industry association, trade union, physicians?
group, or the plaintiffs? bar? Must the judge recuse in all cases that affect the association?s interests? Must the judge recuse in all cases in which a party or lawyer is a member of that group? Does it matter how much the litigant contributed to the association?

9. What if the case involves a social or ideological issue rather than a financial one? Must a judge recuse from cases involving, say, abortion rights if he has received ?disproportionate? support from individuals who feel strongly about either side of that issue? If the supporter wants to help elect judges who are ?tough on crime,? must the judge recuse in all criminal cases?

10. What if the candidate draws ?disproportionate? support from a particular racial, religious, ethnic, or othergroup, and the case involves an issue of particular importance to that group?

11. What if the supporter is not a party to the pending orimminent case, but his interests will be affected by thedecision? Does the Court?s analysis apply if the supporter ?chooses the judge? not in his case, but in someone
else?s?

12. What if the case implicates a regulatory issue that is ofgreat importance to the party making the expenditures,
even though he has no direct financial interestin the outcome (e.g., a facial challenge to an agency rulemaking or a suit seeking to limit an agency?s jurisdiction)?

13. Must the judge?s vote be outcome determinative in order for his non-recusal to constitute a due processviolation?

14. Does the due process analysis consider the underlying merits of the suit? Does it matter whether the decision is clearly right (or wrong) as a matter of state law?

15. What if a lower court decision in favor of the supporter is affirmed on the merits on appeal, by a panel with no?debt of gratitude? to the supporter? Does that ?moot? the due process claim?

16. What if the judge voted against the supporter in many other cases?

17. What if the judge disagrees with the supporter?s message or tactics? What if the judge expressly disclaims the support of this person?

18. Should we assume that elected judges feel a ?debt of hostility? towards major opponents of their candidacies?
Must the judge recuse in cases involving individuals or groups who spent large amounts of money trying unsuccessfully to defeat him?

19. If there is independent review of a judge?s recusal decision, e.g., by a panel of other judges, does this completely
foreclose a due process claim?

20. Does a debt of gratitude for endorsements by newspapers, interest groups, politicians, or celebrities also give rise to a constitutionally unacceptable probability of bias? How would we measure whether such support is disproportionate?

21. Does close personal friendship between a judge and a party or lawyer now give rise to a probability of bias?

22. Does it matter whether the campaign expenditures come from a party or the party?s attorney? If from a lawyer, must the judge recuse in every case involving that attorney?

23. Does what is unconstitutional vary from State to State? What if particular States have a history of expensive
judicial elections?

24. Under the majority?s ?objective? test, do we analyze the due process issue through the lens of a reasonable person,
a reasonable lawyer, or a reasonable judge?

25. What role does causation play in this analysis? The Court sends conflicting signals on this point. The majority
asserts that ?[w]hether Blankenship?s campaign contributions were a necessary and sufficient cause of Benjamin?s victory is not the proper inquiry.? . . . But elsewhere in the opinion, the majority considers ?the apparent effect such contribution had on the outcome of the election,? . . . and whether the litigant has been able to ?choos[e] the judge in his own cause,? ante, at 16. If causation is a pertinent factor, how do we know whether the contribution or expenditure had any effect on the outcome of the election? What if the judge won in a landslide? What if the judge won primarily because of his opponent?s missteps?

26. Is the due process analysis less probing for incumbent judges?who typically have a great advantage in elections?
than for challengers?

27. How final must the pending case be with respect to the contributor?s interest? What if, for example, the onlyissue on appeal is whether the court should certify aclass of plaintiffs? Is recusal required just as if the issue in the pending case were ultimate liability?

28. Which cases are implicated by this doctrine? Must the case be pending at the time of the election? Reasonably
likely to be brought? What about an important but unanticipated case filed shortly after the election?

29. When do we impute a probability of bias from one party to another? Does a contribution from a corporation
get imputed to its executives, and vice-versa?Does a contribution or expenditure by one family member get imputed to other family members?

30. What if the election is nonpartisan? What if the election is just a yes-or-no vote about whether to retain an incumbent?

31. What type of support is disqualifying? What if the supporter?s expenditures are used to fund voter registration
or get-out-the-vote efforts rather than television advertisements?

32. Are contributions or expenditures in connection with a primary aggregated with those in the general election? What if the contributor supported a different candidatein the primary? Does that dilute the debt of gratitude?

33. What procedures must be followed to challenge a state judge?s failure to recuse? May Caperton claims only beraised on direct review? Or may such claims also be brought in federal district court under 42 U. S. C. §1983, which allows a person deprived of a federal right by a state official to sue for damages? If §1983claims are available, who are the proper defendants?The judge? The whole court? The clerk of court?

34. What about state-court cases that are already closed? Can the losing parties in those cases now seek collateral
relief in federal district court under §1983? What statutes of limitation should be applied to such suits?

35. What is the proper remedy? After a successful Caper-ton motion, must the parties start from scratch before the lower courts? Is any part of the lower court judgment retained?

36. Does a litigant waive his due process claim if he waitsuntil after decision to raise it? Or would the claim only be ripe after decision, when the judge?s actions or vote suggest a probability of bias?

37. Are the parties entitled to discovery with respect to the judge?s recusal decision?

38. If a judge erroneously fails to recuse, do we apply harmless-error review?

39. Does the judge get to respond to the allegation that he is probably biased, or is his reputation solely in thehands of the parties to the case?

40. What if the parties settle a Caperton claim as part of abroader settlement of the case? Does that leave the judge with no way to salvage his reputation?

Full post as published by Mass Law Blog on June 08, 2009 (boomark / email).