Legal Commentary

The real March Madness

By Tom Kirkendall

As I've noted many times, big-time college sports in the U.S. is structured in a corrupt manner, but it's an entertaining form of corruption that makes reform difficult (how would reform affect my team?).

That reality rears its rather unsavory head each March as the nation looks forward to the NCAA Basketball Tournament, in which predominantly young black males entertain us in return for legally-sanctioned, below-market compensation. Most of the players do not make it into the high-dollar dream world of the less-compensation restricted forms of professional basketball (the NBA and the other professional leagues), and many of the players do not even receive a real college education or graduate. Many end up with little other than a life of dealing with the after-effects of serious injuries.

To make matters even worse, as Andrew Zimbalist notes in this WSJ op-ed, most academic institutions lose their shirt attempting to compete in this entertaining form of corruption:

The annual three-week orgy of basketball, involving the nation's top 65 college teams, is once again upon us. March Madness they call it, and madness it is. [.  .  .]

So, a captivated national audience, a massive television deal and dozens of corporations drooling to get a piece of the action must all add up to a financial bonanza, right? Not quite.

There are a few winners. The National Collegiate Athletic Association, for instance, makes out quite well. Last year, Madness brought in $548 million from TV rights and an additional $40 million from ticket sales and sponsorships, together representing an eye-popping 96% of all NCAA revenue.

Amid this cornucopia, the schools themselves are usually the losers. According to the NCAA's latest Revenues and Expenses report, in 2005-06 the median Division I men's basketball team generated revenue of $480,000 and had operating costs of $1.33 million, yielding a net operating loss of $850,000. If capital expenses and full university overhead were included, these results would be even more dismal.

The most successful programs, of course, will do better (the top 10 basketball teams had revenues of more than $11 million), but even these programs frequently lose money when the accounting is done properly. Why?

Most of the 300-plus Division I schools aspire to make it to the March tournament. To do so, they have to spend big. Since they can't go to a free-agent market to hire the best high-school players, they attempt to attract them in other ways. First, they spend lavishly to court the players during the recruitment process.

Next, they attempt to provide state-of-the-art arenas and training facilities, complete with luxury suites, Jumbotron scoreboards and spacious locker rooms. They invest in academic tutoring facilities, costing as much as $15 million, to help the athletes stay eligible for competition. Then they hire well-known coaches with a reputation for sending an occasional player to the NBA.

And the coaches don't fare too shabbily either. In 2005-06, the head coaches of the 65 Division I teams in Madness had an average maximum compensation of $959,486, with the top paid coach earning a guaranteed salary of $2.1 million and a maximum salary of $3.4 million. These figures exclude extensive perquisites, including free use of cars, housing subsidies, country-club memberships, access to private jets, exceptionally generous severance packages, handsome opportunities for outside income, and more.

These guys are making almost as much as NBA coaches, even though their teams' revenues generally are below one-tenth those in the senior circuit. The trick, of course, is that the players aren't allowed to be paid, so the coaches, in essence, get the value produced by their recruits. It doesn't hurt that college sports benefit from state subsidies and federal tax exemptions, and that they have no stockholders looking for quarterly profits.

There is a better way.

Full post as published by Houston's Clear Thinkers on March 12, 2009 (boomark / email).