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Prior bad acts case

Kerry E. McQueen and Stephen C. Griffis won in State v. Prine, No. 93,345 (Kan. Jan. 16, 2009), obtaining a new trial in a Finney County statutory rape case. The KSC reversed because of improper admission of prior bad acts pursuant to K.S.A. 60-455. The KSC held that intent nor absence of mistake or accident were not at issue in the statutory rape case and therefore the prior bad acts could not be admitted on those bases. The KSC went on to discuss in some detail the plan basis for admission of such evidence:

We hope and expect that future analytical consistency in these especially wrenching cases can be improved and maximized if we settle on uniform language to describe the degree of similarity that must exist before a district judge admits evidence of prior bad acts to prove plan or modus operandi under K.S.A. 60-455. We regard the standard of "so 'strikingly similar' in pattern or so distinct in method of operation as to be a 'signature' to be the most sound and will apply it exclusively when the State's admission of K.S.A. 60-455 evidence to prove plan is challenged on appeal. We believe this standard gives appropriate deference to the current legislative choice of language in the statute, language plainly selected to disallow evidence of prior bad acts admitted only to show propensity to commit a charged crime or crimes. Without
such a standard, one with identifiable meat on its bones, the line between mere propensity evidence and plan evidence is simply too thin for this court?or any court?to traverse predictably or reliably.

As mentioned above, this standard governs examination of whether particular evidence has probative value, one of the two components of relevance, as outlined in Vasquez. If a defendant's prior bad act is so strikingly similar in pattern or so distinct in method of operation as to be a signature, then it is probative of defendant's plan in the case at bar. If it is not, then the evidence has no probative value on plan and the evidence is irrelevant if offered for that purpose. On appeal, we will review a district judge's decision under the "signature" standard for an abuse of discretion.

Turning to a comparison of the evidence of prior bad acts admitted to prove Prine's plan here, we note that all three crimes are similar in the approximate ages and the gender of the victims. However, the specific sex acts among the victims differed. A.M.C. described discrete events of three types. S.M. described two other types of activities. The account of J.J.S. bore some similarity to one of the activities in which defendant engaged with S.M. and some similarity to a different behavior described by A.M.C. Under the signature standard we have set forth, even in light of the deferential abuse of discretion standard of appellate review, it was error to admit the evidence of Prine's prior bad acts with S.M. and J.J.S. to prove plan in the trial of
A.M.C.'s allegations.

The KSC went on to hold that, given the lack of physical corroborating evidence, the improper admission of prior bad acts was not harmless and reversed.

Here is coverage of the case in the Hutchinson News.

Full post as published by Kansas Defenders on January 17, 2009 (boomark / email).