Labor & Employment Law

Third Circuit decision addresses free speech and termination for just cause issues

Third Circuit decision addresses free speech and termination for just cause issues

Rita Miller v Clinton County [Pennsylvania], USCA, 3^rd Circuit, Docket # 07-2105

In this case, the Circuit Court of Appeals sets out the guidelines followed by courts in resolving claims by public officers and employees that their employer has violated their First Amendment right to free speech and the impact of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement on judicial control over the hiring, discharge and supervision of judicial employees.

Rita Miller, a former employee of the Clinton County [Pennsylvania] Probation office, brought a civil rights action against the President Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Clinton County, Pennsylvania, Richard Saxton, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, claiming that Judge Saxton terminated her employment in violation of her First Amendment right to free speech, her Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and in violation of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. Although a federal district court denied Judge Saxton?s motion to dismiss Miller?s complaint, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, reversed the lower court?s ruling.

The Circuit Court first addressed Miller?s free speech claims, indicating that they have been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment?s due process clause and therefore applicable against the states

According to the decision, Miller wrote a letter to Judge Saxton expressing her dissatisfaction with the Probation Office, describing what she characterized as ?stressful conditions? and her unhappiness with her supervisors. Judge Saxton fired Miller immediately after receiving her letter.

Citing City of Philadelphia, 55 F.3d 886, the court said that with respect to her allegation that her termination was an ?unconstitutional firing,? she must establish that her speech was protected, and that it was a motivating factor in the alleged retaliatory dismissal. If she can do so, Judge Saxton must then establish that he would have taken the same employment action ?even in the absence of the protected conduct.?

Here, said the court, ?we are only concerned with the first part of that inquiry - whether the speech was protected - and that is solely a question of law.? To be protected, the speech must implicate a matter of public concern and must outweigh the employer?s interest in the effective operations of its public services. Speech implicates a matter of public concern if the content, form, and context establish that the speech involves a matter of political, social, or other concern to the community.

If the speech touches on a matter of public concern, courts must then balance the employee?s interest in engaging in her speech with the employer?s countervailing interests, including the employer?s prerogative of removing employees whose conduct impairs performance; and concerns for the morale of the workplace, harmonious relationships among co-workers, and the regular operation of the enterprise.

The Circuit Court found that ?In launching into an attack on management and her supervisors, Miller?s letter did manage to brush ever so gently against a matter of public concern?. However, that seemingly serendipitous encounter does not convert her personal grievance into protected speech.?

As to Miller?s claims a right to notice and an opportunity to be heard before being terminated as well as a substantive due process property interest in employment, the court concluded that since Miller?s speech is unprotected, she cannot establish a First Amendment retaliation claim.

Another aspect of Miller?s appeal concerned her claim that she was protected by a ?termination for just cause? provision set out in a collective bargaining agreement.

The court said that the existence of a ?termination for just cause only? provision in the collective bargaining agreement does not does not change this result insofar as Miller was concerned.

The Circuit Court explained that the power to appoint necessary personnel is inherent in the judicial power, whereby ?The authority to supervise and to discharge court-appointed employees is not only a necessary corollary to this appointment power but is also essential to the maintenance of an independent judiciary.?

Although in Pennsylvania county commissioners ?are the exclusive representative of management in representation proceedings and collective bargaining under [the Pennsylvania Employee Relations Act] involving court employees paid from county funds,? the exclusive authority of county commissioners to negotiate ?wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment,? does not affect the inherent right of judges to hire, discharge and supervise court employees.

While county commissioners are not prohibited from negotiating ?wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment,? the Circuit Court said that county commissioners may not agree to terms and conditions of employment that impinge upon judicial control of hiring, discharge, and supervision in some concrete manner. Further, said the court, ?the judiciary has the inherent power to prevent any actual impairment of its independence created by the collective bargaining process.?

Thus, concluded the Circuit Court, ?even if the parties to the collective bargaining agreement here intended to grant ?just cause? employment status to court employees, there is absolutely no authority to do so.?

http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/072105p.pdf

Full post as published by New York Public Personnel Law on October 03, 2008 (boomark / email).