Legal Commentary

When I denounced the obscurity of intellectuals last week, several (perhaps justifiably) irate responders noted that I did not explain why I liked some obscure writers and disliked others:  I had no definition of permissible obscurity, beyond my own prejudices (and an admittedly unwholesome desire to tap on the glass just to watch the snakes jump).

There is something to that objection.   Why, I ask myself, do I like puzzling through some stuff that many find obscure (say, Quine?s arguments against the analytic-synthetic distinction), whereas even reading a book review by Judith Butler on Arendt?s Jewish Essays induces nausea (of the non-Sartrean variety)?   

My critics are right:  I ought to have something to say about the matter.

To make some amends, here?s an initial distinction between two types of obscurity, which I hereby dub ?the technical abbreviation? and ?the shibboleth.?  The first seems to me useful; the second, pernicious.  (By the way, I do not claim that this dichotomy is an exhaustive taxonomy of obscurity:  I?m leaving out three other varieties of obscurity, denoted by myself with appropriate obscurity as ?foundational ineffability,? ?exoteric self-protection,? and ?parabolic  mimesis.?  Holding the copyright on all but the second term ? Leo Strauss?s estate?s got that one ? I?ll provide a definition of all them in a later post).

What follows is (1) how technical abbreviation differs from shibboleth; (2) why the former is good and the latter, evil; and (3) why I think that Judith Butler ? or, at least, her epigoni  ? tend to use the latter rather than the former.  (Okay, that last is just to provoke you across the ?jump?:  I?ve really nothing more to say about Butler).

1)    The technical abbreviation is simply a term, phrase, proper noun, Greek letter, or other symbol  that substitutes for a complex but uncontroversially well-defined concept.    ?Elrod v. Burns,? the ?Euler?Lagrange equation,? pi, and ?offsides? (as in soccer) are all examples of technical abbreviation (herein illustratively denoted ?TA?).  Think of ?TA? as a promissory note, a means to simplify conversation among the initiated by making bulky concepts more portable.

The critical point about promissory notes is that they must be redeemed on demand.  The person who presents the term must be able to obtain cold, hard, cash value (to use William James' term) --  that is, a clear account of the TA?s sense, reference, or use (take your choice) -- from the issuer.  Otherwise, the putative TA will suffer from inflation.  In a linguistic version of Gresham?s Law, the inflated term is thrown around promiscuously precisely because it does not have to be redeemed, while genuine TAs are carefully hoarded precisely because they have real value and are costly to deploy.  Eventually, the inflated term is declined as valueless by those to whom they are presented.   

As an example of a real TA, take J.L. Austin?s concept of ?infelicities.?  The term stands for a complex idea ? in brief (and this is just another, slightly longer TA), a misfired or abused performative.  Note that I just gave you three more promissory notes ? misfirings, abuses, and performatives ? in exchange for one.  That?s a lot of redeeming to do ? but Austin redeems all of his promises admirably in Lecture II and III of ?How to do Things with Words.?   (Read it yourself:  It?s summertime, after all.  Pp 12-38 of the 1975 edition).  In general, the Brits seem to be pretty good at redeeming their TAs.  (Perhaps it is because they invented central banking in 1694 and therefore know the value of a sound banknote).

When Tommy Crocker accuses me of rejecting all academic disciplines that deploy TAs ? in his words, ?[l]aw, philosophy, economics, psychoanalysis, literary theory? ? he does me an injustice.  I specifically stated in my initial post that I was referring to obscurity deployed to secure social status by signaling membership in an elite.  TAs are not really obscure in any undesirable sense, so long as the issuer stands by with sufficient specie to redeem the note. 

2)   My initial post referred to a different use of obscure terms, what I dub (incidentally, hereby using a performative) the ?shibboleth.?  Taking my cue from Judges 12:1-6, the shibboleth is any term deployed for the purpose of distinguishing insider from outsider.   The key aspect of the shibboleth is that its users refuse to redeem the note with anything except a further note.  All one gets from them is more pretentious verbiage, which is just more promises for future payment of real cash at a later date.  This is a sure sign that the term is functioning as a badge rather than as a medium of genuine intellectual exchange.

Note that a shibboleth can simultaneously function as a TA.  (?Shibboleth,? after all, is Hebrew for sheave of grain:  if you need grain in Israel, the term could come in handy).  The defining mark of a shibboleth is its user?s purpose:  The user does not want the term to  serve any function beyond identifying those people who ought to be (metaphorically speaking) killed like the Ephraimites crossing the Jordan.  Hence, the shibboleth cannot be redeemed (i.e., explained) without destroying its value as a shibboleth.

(3)  Do Judith Butler?s terms function as shibboleths?  I leave that for you, my forgiving audience (all three of you), to judge.  My only data point from the last blow-out was that, when Stuart Buck repeatedly asked for someone to clarify Butler?s prose, he got no response.  (One Matthew Cole actually ponied up in response to my post, by defining Butler?s concept of ?performative? as essentially equivalent to Austin?s.  I?ll accept that check any day, redeemable at  J.L. Austin?s Bank of Lecture I).

Really, I do not care to debate further the merits of Butler?s prose.  I?m more interested in the more general point ? which is whether there is a social class out there (call them ?intellectuals,? call them ?Herbert?: The choice of phonemes is a matter of indifference to me) who routinely deploy TAs as shibboleths.  This class tends to specialize in matters both speculative and abstract, delivering propositions that are hard to verify, ideologically loaded, and poisonous in their capacity to inspire vindictive quarrels. 

I do not like this unnamed class of people.  I believe that they impede genuine intellectual exchange with inflated terms of dubious redeemability.  I call their social practices ?intellectualism? as a sort of analogue to ?scientism,? meaning the deploying of scientific-sounding terms as a conversation-stopper.  I believe that certain currents of ideas from certain nameless European nations, have a greater tendency to promote shibboleths than others.  (Incidentally, these currents also generate some good TAs as well -- and the TAs can be converted into shibboleths, as I noted above).  Finally, I see a lot of these folks in the Village, where I work.

I admit that the credo above is nothing but a summary of my prejudices.  I might be a philistine ? indeed, certainly am, about some matters.  But, I say, better a philistine than a phony.  And you can take both of those TAs to the bank.