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House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence: "The China Deep Dive: A Report on the Intelligence Community?s Capabilities and Competencies with Respect to the People?s Republic of China

Adam Schiff is no friend to the Trump Administration (e.g., here).  And yet it appears that the House intelligence Committee he chairs has now produced a Report that aligns quite nicely with President Trump's  National Security Strategy of the US with which the America First Initiative is conjoined (Ruminations 76: From Global to Fortress America; Thoughts on "National Security Strategy of the United States" (4 Dec 2017)). It also joins coherently with underlying policy development that has been produced over the last four years through the work of the  bipartisan Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC). One begins to see the alignment of views (belatedly) among all current American political factions at least with respect to the People's Republic of China.

The Report,  "The China Deep Dive: A Report on the Intelligence Community?s Capabilities and Competencies with Respect to the People?s Republic of China," has not received much attention. The Wall Street Journal provided perhaps the best summary: 

The lack of attention is understandable given the tenor of the times. And yet The China Deep Dive it is worth a careful reading if only for a sense of the almost inexcusable tardiness of the focus on a quite dynamic relationship with China that appears no longer driven by the United States, and for its continued evidence of a shallowness that ultimately will not serve the interests of the United States. The Report contained remarkably little finger pointing, and what there was (e.g., Report pp. 4-6 in summary) was well deserved.

The 37 page portion of the Report made public may be downloaded HERE and follows below along with brief reflections.  

1.  I was troubled that when I first read it I thought the Report (and reporting about it) was fake. But then I realized that I was reading a political report. In¡deed I was tempted in parts to run searches for the use of the same terms in media reports. And then I had a look at the footnotes and realized that much of the analysis did indeed reflect elite consensus reporting. With the conflation of reporting and political factionalism in the United States in this century (a return to an earlier pattern from the beginning of the 20th century which for a short while had been less aggressively practiced) it appeared that there was a strong invitation top read this as a political document.  That is fair, especially given the origins of the Report in the organ of national government meant to intimately reflect American politics. To the extent that is is indeed the case I can only hope that something more rigorously analytical was produced in secret for the eyes of those responsible for the US intelligence (and counter-intelligence) projects.  

2. Yet given this assumption, the Report becomes a richer read.  First it becomes easier to assess the extent of interlinking with other key actors with respect to the discourse around which objectives and challenges are framed. The use of similar discursive or rhetorical flourishes provides clues about both alignment  and on an inter-institutional level, with interlinkages among those working beneath the public heads of the institutions producing these analyses. Second, it provides stronger clues about underlying coherence in the movement of political consensus (even as it also reveals fractures in methodologies to achieve objectives).  Third, it serves as a rich source of interlinkage between the officials within the state apparatus and their influential counterparts outside the government.  This data is extraordinarily revealing and quite useful--to foreigners and others seeking to understand and exploit, manage, infiltrate, or disrupt those connecitons.  Data analytics now makes much of this quite easy if one has the technology, funds, and personnel to attempt it. Footnotes, in this case, tend to serve as the weak underbelly of reporting like this--at least form the perspective of counterintelligence ("theirs" not "ours").

3. The Americans--at least that group of insiders and their networks who feed core information to state organs like Mr. Schiff's committee--appear to be doing a better job at understanding China.  And yet it is clear that they do this reluctantly, and only from their own perspective.  That is fatal both to any analysis as well as to the power of the recommendations made.  Yes, it is clear that American and Chinese political ideology do not align.  Yes, it is also clear that Americans remain quite attached their own political philosophies and its principles (whoever contentious American politics may be from time to time).  Yet  attempting to understand deeply Chinese ways of looking at the world through the lens of American ideological ways of looking at the world risks producing flawed and shallow analysis (and thus the irony of the "deep dive" title).  The discussion on pages 9-10 of the Report provides a baseline case in point.  It is not incorrect, but it is more revealing of American sensibilities than of critical thinking driving Chinese policy (and thus driving American countermeasures where necessary).

4. The COVID-19 discussion was remarkable (Report pp. 11-15).  It provides a good summary of the American (and eventually perhaps in European based litigation against China in an international court) the American official line.  And it is quite useful in suggesting what American fear most about the formal mechanisms for information control asserted by the state apparatus under the leadership of the CPC.  And again, the footnotes are revealing for what is embraced, and what is marginalized. That tells America's competitor adversaries much more than the analysis proffered provides in positive benefit in terms of guidance for thew US intelligence community. There is nothing profound in an analysis that conforms what liberal democratic political orders have known about the European, Latin American, and Asian versions of Marxist-Leninist political orders--information is politics, its control must be styrictyly maintained in the service fo political objectives, those objkectives have both powerful internal and external dimensions, and it is likely that informaiton control serves to project nationalinterests and objectives pwoerfully outside the state. That this comes as a surprise in the context of COVID is remarkable.  And likely false.  If that is the case, then the object here is something else--likely political, and most likely projecting a unified and coherent political line with respect to COVID for use elsewhere.

5.  The discussion that follows summarized much information already well circulated, but also appeared to stray from the object of the Report--to measure and reassess the focus of US intellegence and countermeasures strategies. The secrtions also appeared to miss critical elements that would be useful to that end.  For example, the discusison of "China's Military Might" (Report pp. 15-17) might have missed an important wedge issue--the contests between military and non-military CPC leaders over control of the military and military autonomy (e.g.,  ?????????????????????? [Gutian Meeting Resolution" and the Foundation of the Party's Centralized and Unified Leadership System]). The discussion of the China Dream focused on its symptoms (in what ways it is manifesting) rather than on either its basis or its context (e.g., the drive to build on the success of the US but from a socialist basis, and therefore the reflex constantly to look at the US as a measure of its own success). This includes the "China Dream," "Made in China 2025 (which is itself imperiled by the realities of COVID), etc.

6. The "Authoritarian Palybook" leitmotif  serves the Report well.  At the same time it constrains analysis by its inherent analytical narcissism.  The issue is not about American judgments of Chinese practices and ideologies (yes, it is clear Americans officially find them incompatible with their own).  The issue is the ability of American intelligence tyo understand, and where necessary to counter projections of those where they interfere with US interests or seek to embed themselves within the US in threatening ways (e.g., as the Chinese would say, to counter the "black hand" of foreign interference). Data driven governance Chinese style is threatening because it is largely opaque; but then so is that developing in the West though here driven by private enterprises in markets.  I did appreciate the very oblique reference to Hangzhou Report p.19), though there again they missed the point of the extent to which public private partnerships in China (centered in tat city) have dominated this sector (also irrelevant except ti the extent it threatens American interests). 

7. The discussion of the Chinese United Front and its propaganda efforts (Report pp. 20-23) might have profited from a little reflection on its Soviet predecessors.  Communist internationalism is not new; though its practices have changed.  American inability to understand both history and current context detracts from its intelligence mission. But here the problem is not solely directed at China, but rather it centers on the inability of third states to either recognize or counter threats.  Of course, first the natuire of the threat must be quite rigorous analyzed.  That was impossible in this report; it is hoped that in its secret sections a better attemopt was made. 

__________

 

(U) House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

(U) The China Deep Dive: A Report on the Intelligence Community?s Capabilities and Competencies with Respect to the People?s Republic of China

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(U) Table of Contents

(U) Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 3 (U) The People?s Republic of China in 2020.................................................................................. 8 (U) The Chinese Communist Party?s Ideological Vision for the 21st Century .......................... 9 (U) The Emergence of COVID-19 and Transnational Implications of China?s Reach ............ 11 (U) COVID-19 and Domestic Information Control .................................................................. 14 (U) Chinese Military Might....................................................................................................... 15 (U) Technological Advancements and Export of Digital Authoritarianism ............................. 17

(U) The Post-COVID-19 Authoritarian Playbook: Public Health, Surveillance, and Social Control....................................................................................................................................... 19

(U) Counterintelligence, Agents of Influence, and the United Front ........................................ 20

(U) Chinese Propaganda & Disinformation Efforts .................................................................. 22 (U) China and the Intelligence Cycle............................................................................................ 24 (U) Key Findings .......................................................................................................................... 27 (U) Recommendations .................................................................................................................. 31

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(U) Introduction

(U) For the first time in three decades the United States is confronted by the rise of a global competitor. How the United States Intelligence Community meets the challenge of China?s arrival on the global stage, as well as the continued potential for highly disruptive transnational crises that originate within our competitors? borders, the profound technological change transforming societies and communication across the globe, and the international order?s return to near-peer competition will have profound and long-lasting implications on our nation?s continued security, economic prosperity, and ability to preserve America?s democratic way of life.

(U) In late 2019, the emergence of a novel coronavirus in Wuhan, China demonstrated to the world the profound danger associated with transnational crises originating within China?s borders. China?s enduring interest in preserving its own domestic political stability and international image in lieu of fostering a transparent and effective approach to public health, placed the United States, our allies, and the world at risk. Moreover, China?s public response has been to further obfuscate the Chinese Communist Party?s role in this international health crisis through the calculated promotion of fringe conspiracy theories and misinformation seeking to shift blame to the United States, muddy the truth about the virus?s origins, and promote the image of China as a responsible global leader. Beijing?s complicity in stopping scientific inquiries into the origin of the virus, and its disdain for accountability, require a strong U.S. response. Any appropriate U.S. response must be coupled with a rededication to ensuring that collection and analysis of activities within China remains robust, particularly in light of Beijing?s opacity and global relevance.

(U) The United States, and its intelligence community, are no stranger to these moments. When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, followed soon after by the end of the Cold War and the

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collapse of the Soviet Union, the central organizing principle of American national security in the postwar world?the United States? superpower rivalry with the USSR?disappeared. As we entered this new era and a unipolar moment with the United States as global hegemon, the Intelligence Community, like the Department of Defense and other elements of the foreign policy establishment, found itself struggling for relevance and increasingly scarce resources in a country more focused on economic prosperity than security. Budget cuts, staffing reductions, and low morale were compounded by a sense that the CIA and its sister agencies no longer were essential elements of our national power.

(U) The September 11th attacks on New York and Washington shattered the post-Cold War abeyance, and the Intelligence Community was suddenly thrust into the lead role in a new counterterrorism role: defeating al Qaeda and other violent Islamist groups. From Afghanistan to Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula, and Africa, the IC, bolstered by billions in taxpayer dollars and a renewed sense of purpose, took the fight to America's enemies. As the counterterrorism mission expanded, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI or the Committee) assesses that the IC treated traditional intelligence missions as secondary to counterterrorism. The inattention of the 1990s to strategic and emerging threats remained largely unreversed.

(U) But while the United States was busy engaging al Qaeda, ISIS, and their affiliates, offshoots, and acolytes, Washington's unchallenged dominance over the global system slipped away. Russia, while weaker than it had been during the days of the Soviet Union, remained a strategic challenge with a formidable nuclear arsenal and a revanchist ambition to match. Vladimir Putin was and remains committed to recapturing the power and prestige that the country had enjoyed during the Cold War and sought to rebuild the Russian military while taking advantage of every opportunity to confront the United States and its NATO partners. Iran and North Korea, both of which remain fundamentally weak states with sclerotic economies, tied their security to the pursuit of nuclear weapons and, in Iran's case, the sponsorship of a range of proxy terror organizations to extend its influence in the region.

(U) It was China, however, that has used the past two decades to transform itself into a nation potentially capable of supplanting the United States as the leading power in the world.

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China's ascendance has been spectacular in its scale and far less benign than initially expected. During the 1990s and 2000s there was a consensus in the West that, as China became more prosperous and developed, it would also become freer and play a constructive role in international relations in the 21st Century.1 Observers convinced themselves that the leadership in Beijing learned the ?right? lessons from the international and domestic reaction to the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989. As a result, the broad trend as one of convergence between China and the West was assumed. Confidence that China would choose to liberalize was central to the decision to admit China to the WTO and to award the 2008 Summer Olympics to Beijing. This optimism was not entirely unfounded. Indeed, the introduction of village elections within China was considered by some to be a harbinger of liberalization.2

(U) However, the last decade has shown those expectations to have been deeply misplaced. Western policy-makers? belief that our own democratic systems were globally inevitable blinded observers to the Chinese Communist Party?s overriding objective of retaining and growing its power. In the interim, the People?s Republic of China (PRC) has increasingly sought to revise the international order and global norms in a way that furthers its own strategic interests and undermines those of the United States specifically, and the West generally.3 Beijing has sought to expand its economic and political influence through its ?One Belt, One Road? Initiative and the large-scale cooption of media outlets throughout the world.4 Militarily, China has embarked on a massive modernization drive - creating a ?blue water? navy, investing heavily in hypersonic weapons, developing its own fifth-generation fighter, militarizing a series of atolls and islets in the South China Sea to strengthen its claims in the region, and building its first overseas military base in Djibouti. Perhaps most consequential in the decades to come will be China?s investment of resources, technology, and will into the creation of a post-modern authoritarian state in which the country?s population is monitored around the clock through their

1 (U) Kurt M. Campbell and Ely Ratner, ?The China Reckoning: How Beijing Defied American Expectations,? Foreign Affairs, March/April 2018.
2 (U) ?The Role of Elections in Representing the Chinese People and Advancing Democracy,? Public Broadcasting System, January 9, 2007.
3 (U) ?Schieffer Series: China?s Rise,? Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 20, 2019.
4 (U) Sarah Cook, ?Beijing?s Global Megaphone: The Expansion of Chinese Communist Party Media Influence since 2017,? Freedom House, January 2020.

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phones and an ever-growing network of surveillance cameras equipped with facial-recognition technology. Initially fueled by stolen U.S. technology and intellectual property, it is now driven by its own indigenous innovation. Beijing?s expanding technological prowess will enable the Chinese Communist Party to improve its ability to watch, and therefore control, its own population. This ?digital authoritarianism? has not only been deployed at home, but has been increasingly marketed to aspiring authoritarians abroad.5

(U) The confluence of a prolonged overweighting of American intelligence resources towards counterterrorism, the emergence of a global competitor in China, and the widespread, if not yet fully understood, global impact of COVID-19 and other transnational events make this both an opportune and urgent moment to assess our intelligence posture towards China and to provide strategic guidance to the IC as it repositions itself to better understand China?s domestic environment, capabilities, plans, and intentions. Safeguarding U.S. national security requires the capacity to understand Chinese military capabilities, elite political dynamics, and international posture, but also, as the utter devastation of the pandemic has brought home, to provide sufficient indications and warnings for events of global impact, such as a disease outbreak. Notwithstanding the ongoing public debate on the advisability of interdependence, today?s globalized world necessitates thoughtful, detailed, and expansive analysis of how events within China, and how China?s leadership decides to react to those events, have the potential to meaningfully alter the world?s course.

(U) To address this strategic challenge, wise and effective national policy will be critical. Its formulation and implementation in turn will depend on the U.S. Intelligence Community?s (IC) collection, and provision to policymakers, of intelligence of the highest quality. Regardless of what tack U.S. policy takes in the coming decades, a strong IC capability to accurately assess China?s motives and behavior necessitates prioritization and rigorous oversight. If bilateral relations continue to degrade, U.S. leaders must have a clear understanding of the second- and third-order impacts of decisions made both in Washington and Beijing.

5 (U) Naazneen Barma, Brent Durbin, and Andrea Kendall-Taylor, ?Digital Authoritarianism: Finding Our Way Out of the Darkness,? War on the Rocks, February 10, 2020.

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(U) In May 2019, the Committee initiated a review to assess the IC?s ability to execute, with respect to China, its core mission of ?collecting, analyzing, and delivering foreign intelligence and counterintelligence....to America?s leaders so they can make sound decisions.? 6 This review was motivated by two prevailing factors. First, the Committee assessed that the IC?s ability to fulfill emerging intelligence requirements regarding near-peer nation states had atrophied, in part because of the United States? long-standing focus on counterterrorism and Middle East regional issues. Second, the Committee believes that China poses a unique and growing strategic challenge to U.S. national security. The prevailing factors, combined with the real-time implications of disease that emerged in China?s Hubei Province, lead the Committee to conclude that it is imperative that U.S. policymakers have the fullest possible understanding of China?s plans, intentions, capabilities, and public health crises.

(U) Over the course of the review, Committee staff on a bipartisan basis conducted hundreds of hours of interviews with IC officers, examined thousands of analytic assessments, and visited facilities operated by over a dozen IC elements. Additionally, Committee staff solicited feedback on the IC?s performance from customers throughout several departments and agencies. The goals of the Committee?s review were:

(1) (U) assess, with respect to China, the IC?s performance within each of the so-called ?intelligence cycle?s? six phases;

(2) (U) to make recommendations to increase the quality of raw intelligence reports and finished analytic products; and

(3) (U) to assess the adequacy of current IC resource levels.

(U) The review resulted in 23 public findings regarding the IC?s activities with respect to China, 36 public recommendations, and over 100 classified recommendations. While the Committee?s inquiry was focused solely on China, in the course of its review, the Committee identified several items of relevance to the broader structure and governance of the Intelligence Community.

6 (U) ?Mission,? Intel.gov, January 3, 2020, www.intelligence.gov/mission. 7

(U) The Committee?s central finding of this report is that the United States? intelligence community has not sufficiently adapted to a changing geopolitical and technological environment increasingly shaped by a rising China and the growing importance of interlocking non-military transnational threats, such as global health, economic security, and climate change. Absent a significant realignment of resources, the U.S. government and intelligence community will fail to achieve the outcomes required to enable continued U.S. competition with China on the global stage for decades to come, and to protect the U.S. health and security.

(U) The People?s Republic of China in 2020

(U) The nature and pace of China?s transformation into a near-peer, global competitor demands the focused attention of the U.S. intelligence community. Under the leadership of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping, China has sought to expand its global influence through the modernization of the People?s Liberation Army (PLA), the growth of the ?One Belt, One Road? Initiative, the cultivation of foreign sub-national and civic organizations, and the propagation of disinformation. Moreover, important Chinese technological advances in key fields, such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and 5G telecommunications call into question the self-assured preeminence of U.S. technology in the rapidly changing technological landscape. Finally, the emergence of COVID-19 in Wuhan, and Beijing?s reactions to the virus?s early spread, underscore the continued potential for devastating and destabilizing global events originating in China.

(U) These and other developments challenge analysts to synthesize and assess disparate streams of information. The stakes are high. If the IC does not accurately characterize and contextualize Beijing?s intent, America?s leaders will fail to understand the factors that motivate Chinese decision-making. If policymakers do not understand how and why Beijing makes decisions, they will struggle to develop policies that result in outcomes favorable to U.S.

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interests and global security overall. And if the IC does not, in close collaboration with the whole of government, identify early future transnational threats, such as a disease with pandemic potential, history might disastrously repeat itself.

(U) The Chinese Communist Party?s Ideological Vision for the 21st Century

(U) Under the leadership of Chairman Xi Jinping, China has reasserted its ideological commitment to Marxist-Leninism and sought to further cement the Chinese Communist Party within the Chinese state apparatus.7 At the November 2017 19th Party Congress, Xi successfully incorporated his eponymous ?Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,? into the Chinese Communist Party?s constitution. This feat, placing him on par with Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, is representative of Xi?s increasingly singular ability to shape the ideological trajectory of the Party, and therefore China writ-large.8 Inextricably linked to this is the achievement of the ?China Dream,? a concept that Xi has tied to the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, the development of a powerful military capable of defending China?s core interests, the achievement of ?one country, two systems? in Hong Kong and Taiwan, and the elimination of ?lax and weak governance? over the Party through adherence to the mass line.9

(U) Domestically, China has taken new steps to integrate the role of ideological education into daily life. The ?Little Red App? is a Chinese smartphone application that synthesizes social network, indoctrination, and surveillance into a single app extoling the CCP and Xi himself.10 The app, which has been downloaded ninety million times, has been subsequently used as a tool to assess Chinese citizens? ideological commitment to the Party.11 Quizzes test app users? understanding of CCP ideological concepts and monitor the amount of time users have spent engaging with key propaganda themes. Android versions reportedly contain powerful spyware tools, giving the app ?administrator-level access? on the phone, which enables developers to

7 (U) Lucy Hornby, ?Xi Jinping pledges return to Marxist roots for China?s Communists,? Financial Times, July 1, 2016.
8 (U) Michael A. Peters, The Chinese Dream: Xi Jinping thought on Socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era,? Educational Philosophy and Theory, 49:14, 1299-1304, 2017.

9 (U) Xi Jinping, ?Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,? October 18, 2017.
10 (U) Raymond Zhong, ?Little Red App: Xi?s Thoughts are (Surprise!) a Hit in China,? The New York Times, February 14, 2019.

11 (U) Evan Osnos, ?The Future of America?s Contest with China,? the New Yorker, January 6, 2020. 9

download software, take photos and videos from the phone, transmit the users? location, or even install a program to log keystrokes.12 In short, the CCP is seeking to expand its control of China?s population through technologically-enhanced authoritarianism.13

(U) We expect China?s use of digital authoritarianism to continue to be exported beyond its own borders. While China?s leadership asserts that its pursuit of the Chinese Dream has led China to make ?great new contributions to global peace and development,? the ?peace and development? that Beijing seeks to promote is defined in ways that preference Beijing?s objectives. Indeed, Xi Jinping?s signature foreign policy concept, the creation of ?a community of shared future for mankind,? is considered to be foundational to the creation of a ?new type of international relations? in which the external international environment is favorably disposed to the achievement of the China Dream.14 Worryingly, it appears as if those outside of Beijing have little opportunity to define what this ?community of shared future for mankind? might consist of, particularly as China continues to pressure international organizations to integrate its own ideological maxims into multilateral agreements.15 This raises the specter of the further globalization of Beijing?s ideology, potentially degrading longstanding international norms concerning the rights of the individual, and the very idea of liberal and free societies.

(U) Chinese officials? belief that China?s model and system of governance are exceptional and infallible has helped to fuel China?s recent advancements in the military, technological, and information domains. Chinese commentators have painted the United States? commitment to democracy as outdated and violent, championing their own interpretation of ?democracy? as an appropriate model for the international system.16 However, recent events in Hong Kong demonstrate that, even under the remit of ?one country, two systems,? it is unlikely

12 (U) Anna Fifield, ?Chinese app on Xi?s ideology allows data access to users? phones, report says,? The Washington Post, October 12, 2019.
13 (U) Samantha Hoffman, ?Testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Hearing on ?China?s Digital Authoritarianism: Surveillance, Influence, and Political Control,?? May 16, 2019.
14 (U) Liza Tobin, ?Xi?s Vision for Transforming Global Governance: A strategic Challenge for Washington and Its Allies,? Texas National Security Review, 2:1, November 2018.
15 (U) Colum Lynch, Robbie Gramer, ?Senior Officials Concede Loss of U.S. Clout as Trump Prepares for U.N. Summit,? Foreign Policy, September 5, 2019.
16 (U) Ai Jun, ?Washington not world?s ?beacon of democracy,?? The Global Times, September 16, 2019.
Tobin, ??Xi?s Vision for Transforming Global Governance: A strategic Challenge for Washington and Its Allies.?

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that true democratic life and the CCP in its current form can coexist in a peaceful and constructive way.17 The mass internment of over one million ethnic Muslims in Xinjiang province demonstrates the CCP?s willingness to engage in gross human rights abuses, in a fashion so pervasive and widespread as to potentially implicate the government in crimes against humanity.18 The U.S. must summon the moral courage to condemn these heinous crimes in the strongest terms and rally the world to join.

(U) The Emergence of COVID-19 and Transnational Implications of China?s Reach

(U) As evidenced by the global COVID-19 pandemic, the United States would be remiss to assume that the totality of events originating within China with national security or economic implications emanate solely from Beijing and Shanghai. In late 2019, a strain of novel coronavirus emerged in Wuhan, China. Notwithstanding Wuhan?s large population and regional prominence in central China, Wuhan is in many respects a typical Chinese city. The average annual income for workers in Wuhan is approximately $12,600 USD. Several large multinational corporations such as General Motors, Starbucks, and McDonalds have locations in the Wuhan area.19 Regular direct flights left Wuhan?s international airport for New York, San Francisco, and other global destinations as the virus spread undetected from December 2019 to January 2020.20 This global connection does not make Wuhan exceptional. In fact, its trajectory closely mirrors many mega-cities in contemporary China. However, despite the city?s growing engagement with the global economy and its population of approximately 11 million?several million more than New York City?most Americans were unfamiliar with Wuhan. The emergence of COVID-19 underscores that, notwithstanding the global focus on Beijing, Shanghai, and Hong Kong, there are a significant number of cities throughout China that could ? and in the case of COVID-19 do ? independently impact the world and our own country?s trajectory in dramatic ways.

17 (U) Peter S. Goodman and Austin Ramzy, ?Hong Kong?s Status as Neutral Ground at Risk as China Asserts Power,? The New York Times, October 1, 2019.
18 (U) ?Annual Report: 2019,? Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 116

Full post as published by Law at the End of the Day on October 10, 2020 (boomark / email).

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