Family Law

Linda and Steve got a divorce.  During the divorce Linda proved that she was the victim of domestic violence at the hand of Steve.  In part because of the domestic violence finding, the family law judge order Steve to pay spousal support to Linda.  Linda then filed a personal injury lawsuit against Steve, arising from the domestic violence.  Steve tried to block the personal injury suit by arguing that Linda had already been compensated through the award of spousal support in the dissolution action (for all you lawyers out there he argued "res judicata/claim preclusion").

According to the Court of Appeals Steve's argument fails.  The two claims were separate and distinct.

A tort action like the present one is based on ?the primary right to be free from personal injury? (no matter how many different tort theories may be alleged). (Sawyer v. First City Financial Corp. (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 390, 399.) ?It is clearly established that ?. . . there is but one cause of action for one personal injury [which is incurred] by reason of one wrongful act.?? (Slater v. Blackwood (1975) 15 Cal.3d 791, 795.) There is no sound basis, however, for concluding that a claim for spousal support in a marital dissolution proceeding is also based on ?the primary right to be free from personal injury,? even if one of the circumstances the family court considers in adjudicating that claim is domestic violence between the parties.

The Family Code recognizes that a person has a right to spousal support from his or her former spouse under certain circumstances. Specifically, subdivision (a) of Family Code section 4330 provides that ?[i]n a judgment of dissolution of marriage or legal separation of the parties, the court may order a party to pay for the support of the other party an amount, for a period of time, that the court determines is just and reasonable, based on the standard of living established during the marriage, taking into consideration the circumstances as provided in Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 4320).? One of the many circumstances set forth in Family Code section 4320 is ?[d]ocumented evidence of any history of domestic violence . . . between the parties.? (Fam. Code, § 4320, subd. (i).)

In our view, this provision, which requires a family court to consider evidence of domestic violence in determining whether an award of spousal support is appropriate, and if so, how much support is just and reasonable, does not seek to vindicate the primary right to be free from personal injury, as a tort action for domestic violence does. Rather, subdivision (i) of Family Code section 4320 is just one of many provisions that exist to vindicate the primary right of a party in a marital dissolution (or legal separation) proceeding to obtain spousal support from the other party if the circumstances justify such support.

Because the same primary right does not underlie a request for spousal support in a marital dissolution proceeding and a tort action for damages, the doctrine of claim preclusion does not preclude a person from offering evidence of domestic violence in connection with a request for spousal support in a dissolution proceeding, then suing for damages for domestic violence, or vice versa. Accordingly, a judgment in a dissolution proceeding where claims of domestic violence were (or could have been) litigated with relation to a claim for spousal support does not preclude a later tort action for domestic violence.

Please click here the read the Court's opinion.

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