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Patent Law
: The Patent ProspectorMomentos
By Gary Odom and Jordan Kuhn
Media
Technologies sued Upper Deck for infringing two memorabilia patents:
5,803,501 &
6,142,532. After a trip to the CAFC on district court summary judgment over
res judicata (reversed), trial court proceedings were stayed pending
reexamination. Both patents made it through reexam unscathed. Then, based on
claim construction, Upper Deck got the upper hand by summary judgment over
obviousness.
Media Technologies v. Upper Deck et al (CAFC 2009-1022) precedential
The facts supposedly uncontested, the decision was a treated as a matter of law.
Whether an invention would have been obvious at the time the invention was made is a question of law, which we review de novo, based on underlying factual determinations, which we review for clear error, Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2007), unless, as is the case here, no material facts are in dispute.
A patent may not be obtained "if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains." 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). An obviousness analysis is based on several factual inquiries. A court must examine the scope and content of the prior art, the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue, and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406-07 (2007) (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966)). At that point, a court may consider secondary objective evidence of nonobviousness, such as commercial success, long felt but unsolved need, failure of others, and the like. Id.
A patchwork of prior art was called upon.
The prior art here includes: (a) a trading card with a picture of Marilyn Monroe and a diamond attached to the card ("Monroe"); (b) a piece of a sheet purportedly slept on by one of the Beatles attached to a copy of a letter on Whittier Hotel stationery declaring authenticity ("Whittier"); (c) a piece of fabric purportedly belonging to a Capuchin Friar named Stephen Eckert attached to paper stock including a picture of the friar ("Eckert"); and (d) a greeting card fashioned to look like a novelty item that ostensibly includes a piece of jeans material belonging to James Dean ("Dean").
Media Tech argued unpredictability.
Media Tech asserts that a person of ordinary skill would not have combined the references--or applied them to a sports card--based on: (1) an inability to predict that a trading card would convey memorabilia authenticity; and (2) the trading card field containing an infinite number of identified and unpredictable solutions.
That went over like a lead balloon.
The "inability to predict" argument alleges that "combin[ing] . . . trading cards with a piece of a memorabilia item . . . result[ed in] . . . consumers automatically accept[ing] as authentic a piece of otherwise unidentifiable material." However, as Media Tech itself acknowledges, consumer acceptance comes from the credibility already associated with the 90-year old trading card industry. As such, Media Tech has not shown that the combination of memorabilia with a conventional trading card resulted, or would result, in consumers accepting authenticity.
Regarding the infinite number of identified and unpredictable solutions, the presentation and content characteristics of trading cards are not infinite. These characteristics are limited by the cards' physical characteristics. Moreover, while presentation involves varying parameters (color, typefaces, layout, etc.) to produce distinctive products, the asserted claims are unrelated to presentation. Instead, they relate to content. Content solutions are significantly limited by the theme and physical confines of the card, and the finite number of available solutions were predictable. Defendants need only show that it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art to attach a sports-related item instead of those items attached in the prior art references. Defendants have met this burden, and Media Tech's assertion that a person of ordinary skill would not have combined the references--or applied them to a sports card--must fail.
Secondary considerations were treated like old news.
Secondary objective evidence also fails to establish non-obviousness. Media Tech argues long felt but unsolved need and failure of others; initial skepticism; commercial success; unexpected results; and industry recognition.
Media Tech's "long felt but unsolved need" of "stimulat[ing] demand" suffers two deficiencies. First, the need does not correspond to the asserted claims because it is overbroad. Second, "stimulat[ing] demand" is applied too narrowly to trading card inserts.
With respect to "skepticism," Media Tech's expert states that "[n]umerous articles and commentators, including myself, originally predicted that memorabilia cards would be a short lived phenomenon and many trading card companies such as Fleer and Topps were skeptical of the concept and reluctant to introduce memorabilia cards." But this is not supported by the record. Media Tech also relies on outrage at the idea of "destroying valuable sports memorabilia." Alleged outrage over destroying sports memorabilia, however, does not demonstrate a belief that the trading-card beneficiary of that destruction would fail.
Regarding commercial success, Media Tech has established that the alleged infringing memorabilia cards sold by appellees are commercially successful; however, it has not established the required nexus between the claimed invention and commercial success. Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 463 F.3d 1299, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ("if the commercial success is due to an unclaimed feature of the device, the commercial success is irrelevant"). It attempts to rely on the "presum[ption] that the commercial success is due to the patented invention." Id. To do so it must show "that the successful product is the invention disclosed and claimed in the patent." Id. (quoting J.T. Eaton & Co. v. Atl. Paste & Glue Co., 106 F.3d 1563, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
In arguing unexpected results, Media Tech returns to its argument that a person of ordinary skill would not have predicted commercial success. This is an attempt to recycle its commercial success arguments by making similar arguments under the "unexpected results" heading. Commercial success, however, even if unexpected, is not part of the "unexpected results" inquiry. An unexpected result must arise from combining prior art elements; commercial success is a separate inquiry from unexpected results, and in any event has not been shown here to be a result of the invention as opposed to other factors.
Affirmed.
So far, unremarkable in the post-Obzilla regime. But this was a 2-1 decision, penned by Judge Mayer, joined by Lourie, with a scathing dissent by Judge Rader, the next Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. The Pooh-bah-to-be:
Relying on wholly irrelevant prior art and ignoring significant objective indicia of non-obviousness, this court substitutes its judgment on patentability for that of a jury. Lurking just beneath the surface of this court's blindness to the underlying facts supporting non-obviousness is a bias against non-technical arts. No doubt, the invention of the transistor or of the polio vaccine came from more scientific fields and contributed more to the welfare of humanity. This court, however, cannot overlook that many individuals invest vast energies, efforts, and earnings to advance these non-technical fields of human endeavor. Those investments deserve the same protection as any other advances. The incentives for improvement and the protection of invention apply as well to the creator of a new hair-extension design as to a researcher pursuing a cure for cancer. In either case, the PTO and this court are charged with assessing the invention disclosure to determine its worthiness to receive a valuable, but temporally limited, exclusive right. Because this court dismisses this case so readily, I respectfully dissent.
Delving into history, Judge Rader paints a vastly different portrait of invention.
As mentioned, this invention does not advance rocket science or cancer medicine. Still, for many individuals, this avocation wins vast devotion. The trading card industry was born in the late 19th century when tobacco companies began inserting images of baseball players into cigarette packs. Soon thereafter the trading card concept spread to other industries, most notably gum companies. Over the next century, the cards became standardized and sold in stand-alone packs without any tandem product, such as gum or peanuts. By the early 1990s, with competition intensifying, trading card companies introduced limited edition insert cards -- e.g., autographed cards or holographic cards -- to spark sales with the hope of acquiring a scarce and valuable asset.
The '501 patent was filed in 1994. Up until that point, not a single reference in over a century of history disclosed attaching a cut-up piece of a memorabilia item to a baseball card. The concept behind the invention was initially met with much skepticism. The major trading card companies, including the named defendants in this case, rejected Adrian Gluck, the inventor of the '501 patent. They reasoned, quite logically at the time, that the value of a particular memorabilia item depended on its physical preservation. Indeed, all the prior art suggested that the value of an item of memorabilia hinged on its condition. In better condition, the item brought maximum value; in worse condition, far less. Thus, the notion of cutting up an authentic player's jersey into numerous pieces and attaching it to a trading card seemed sure to destroy far more value than it could ever create. According to the standard wisdom in this field, the dismembered jersey could not enhance the value of either the jersey or the card.
A year after Gluck approached Upper Deck with his idea, however, the company undertook an experiment and began selling limited edition cards with accompanying cut-up jersey pieces affixed adjacent to the player's image. The new card product quickly became a hit with collectors and received praise throughout the formerly skeptical industry.
Without even so much as a cursory review of these unexpected results, the skepticism of experts, the commercial success, the flattery of copying, or any other objective facts, this court concludes in a rather passing fashion that the claimed invention would have been obvious at the time of invention based on the prior art references. But viewed in the context of the record as a whole, the prior art does not support that judgment as a matter of law.
Most important, none of the prior art references are remotely related to the sport trading card industry. The defendants' failure to proffer any reference in the relevant field of invention is telling given the century-old history of this industry. Perhaps claim 1 can fairly be interpreted to include memorabilia items beyond the sporting world, but other asserted claims are expressly limited to sports trading cards. Thus, this court ought to seek at least some prior art in the primary field of its application and use. And the absence of any prior art in that area ought to speak volumes.
Setting aside the sports versus non-sports issue, each of the prior art references in this case is still distinctly different from the claimed invention.
Whereupon Rader incisively shines daylight between the patented invention and each of the cited prior art references, concluding with joke prior art.
The Monroe reference discloses a diamond attached to a photo of Marilyn Monroe on a card. Unlike an authentic jersey worn by an athlete during a game or a match, the diamond itself has no inherent value derived from its "connection with historical, events, culture, or entertainment" as required by the district court's construction for "memorabilia item." Rather, the diamond itself attains cultural significance only when attached to a picture of Marilyn Monroe. In addition, the '501 patent teaches cutting a "memorabilia item" into "pieces." The Monroe diamond is not a "piece" of any "memorabilia item" within the context of the '501 patent.
The Whittier reference discloses a cut-up piece of a bed sheet once graced by one of the Beatles. The Whittier prior art reference attaches the scrap of cloth to a stationery paper with a statement of authenticity. It bears the date 1964. Besides the defendant's admission that the bed sheet in one of its proffered exhibits is a fake, the reference also does not disclose any "trading card" or "photo" as those terms are used in the '501 patent. This reference has many differences besides its distant removal in time.
The Eckert reference is a "holy card" used to familiarize the public with a particular religious figure to promote that candidate for sainthood. A picture of a friar named Stephen Eckert appears on paper stock next to fabric represented as a piece of his clothing. As with the Monroe reference, it is a far stretch at best to say that Eckert discloses a "memorabilia item" as contemplated by the district court's construction. Nor were "holy cards" purchased, traded, or valued like typical trading cards or "memorabilia items." Their sole purpose was to increase the fame of the particular religious figure featured.
Finally, the James Dean reference features a picture of James Dean on a greeting card next to an undisputedly fake piece of the celebrity's jeans. It is entitled, "Rebel's Cause Lives: Ecstatic discovery! James Dean's Jeans!" Despite defendants' general admission that the prior art reference itself was intended as a joke, they still maintain that the reference would have motivated a skilled artisan to cut up a memorabilia item for a sports card. Quite the opposite, a reasonable inference could be made -- which this court must credit on summary judgment -- that the James Dean reference teaches away from the claimed invention for the very fact that it was a joke, a fake (not a "memorabilia item"), and, in many other ways, different from the claimed invention. In sum, the prior art references of record are each inherently different and lack much of the uniqueness and novelty of the claimed invention.
The combination that Obzilla so easily uses to unlock novelty into the mundanely obvious is turned on its head by Judge Rader.
Finally, the record is dubious at best -- particularly at this summary judgment stage -- in suggesting that a person with skill in this art would even consider the four prior art references relied on by defendants, much less combine them. In that vein, this court cites primarily to defendants' expert Scott Kelley to make the vast leap from these sketchy and different references taken in isolation. Mr. Kelly's declaration, to my eyes, resounds with conclusory statements that lack any convincing reference to the actual record. To rely on such "expertise" without considering the countervailing factual evidence on record contravenes the role of a court at the summary judgment stage and gives accused infringers a free pass to avoid a jury's judgment on the facts -- in a sense, a get-out-of-jail-free card (no pun intended).
Plaintiff also proffered an expert, Henry Taylor, with credentials similar to those of Mr. Kelly but with opposite conclusions on obviousness. Why, on summary judgment, would this court give Mr. Kelly's opinions more weight than those of Mr. Taylor? Is this an indication that this court views this field of art and this invention as unworthy of the full processes of the law?
In addition, this court's analysis about the finite number of solutions in the art is unconvincing. Under this rationale, no party could receive a patent in the trading card industry because the solutions are "limited by the cards' physical characteristics," "theme," and "physical confines." In fact, as noted above, the trading card industry heralded this invention. Thus, the industry that best evaluates advances in its own field seems to question this court's summary conclusion.
I'm sold. Judge Rader convinces.
The bottomless abyss of kneejerk obviousness created by the courts in the wake of Obzilla, already desolation to many inventions, should be filled with careful logical analysis based on fact, especially context, as in this dissent. This was not that beginning, at least for majority opinion. That Judge Rader was unable to convince his colleagues is telling in the moment, but this dissent may resonate through time more than the majority ruling. Only time will tell.
Full post as published by The Patent Prospector on March 03, 2010 (boomark / email).









