International Law

R. v. Hughes

The accused Hughes had seriously injured a cat at his girlfriend’s apartment and they decided to kill it to end its suffering. The girlfriend told the accused to break its neck. He instead decided to strap a weight on top of it and stick it in the microwave.

Cruelty (which means causing unnecessary pain and suffering)? One would have thought so. The trial judge, however, acquitted:

The accused told Sara Kons that he thought the cat would die faster in the microwave. In cross-examination two years later, he agreed that it may be more humane to break its neck than to put it in the microwave. It is not clear that he knew that at the time. It is not clear whether or not Mr. Hughes is correct when he says that.

I am left with this. Mr. Hughes was drinking that night. He accidentally injured the cat. He admitted up to it. He called out for Sara Kons. He was told to kill the cat. He chose a method, (arguably not the most humane, but with no evidence supporting that argument) and killed the cat by putting it into the microwave. The purpose of his act was to end the cat?s suffering, not to cause suffering.

This was successfully appealed.

I am satisfied that the learned trial judge fell into error when he stated that the purpose of putting the cat in the microwave was to end the cat’s suffering, not to cause suffering. That, in my view, is not the issue. The issue is whether or not the Crown has proven that putting a cat in a microwave with a weighted strap on top of it, closing the door of the microwave and turning on the cooking device for approximately 54 seconds is wilfully causing unnecessary pain, suffering, or injury.

If one were to look to the subjective foreseeability of unnecessary pain, suffering and injury, one might look to the past statements of the accused as well as his demeanour and actions after removing the cat from the microwave. The respondent had previously stated that he hates cats and that he had talked about what it would be like to put a cat in a microwave. On the night of the incident in question, he weighed down the cat, placed it in the microwave, and activated the appliance. After the respondent removed the cat from the microwave, it was convulsing, and as Ms. Kons described it, “screaming.” This is certainly strong evidence of the degree of pain and suffering to which the cat was subjected. Rather than displaying shock or remorse, the respondent then threw the cat at Ms. Kons. On the level of subject foreseeability, this is strong evidence upon which to find that the respondent knew and intended for his actions to cause unnecessary pain, suffering and injury to the cat. However, as articulated in R. v. Clarke, s. 446(1)(a) only requires the objective standard of reasonable foreseeability be satisfied.

I am satisfied the Crown has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused acted wilfully when he placed the cat in the microwave, knowing that unnecessary pain, suffering and injury would likely result, or that a reasonable person would realize that it was a likely result. I am satisfied that the Crown has proven that the unnecessary pain, suffering and injury was a reasonably foreseeable consequence.

Full post as published by Criminal Review on May 31, 2008 (boomark / email).