Home -> Law Blog Directory -> Appellate Law Blogs -> The California Blog of Appeal
(866) 635-2689 for Personal Injury or (866) 635-9402 for Criminal Defense
Find a Local Lawyer
Divorce (866) 635-6190
Personal Injury (866) 635-2689
Criminal Defense (866) 635-9402
Appellate Law: The California Blog of Appeal
Waiver of Appeal Rights in Plea Agreements
By Greg May
Plea agreements often waive the right to appeal, but they aren’t always what they seem, especially when it comes to how they define the scope of the waiver. For a lesson in how to determine whether a defendant has waived the right to bring a particular appeal, check out United States v. Cope, case no. 06-50441 (9th Cir. June 4, 2008).
Cope pled guilty to a single count of possession of child pornography and was sentenced to 120 months imprisonment and lifetime supervised release. His plea agreement stated that he waived appeal of his sentence so long as it met three criteria. On appeal, he challenged the length of his supervised release
The court walks you right through the steps, applying these rules:
- The waiver of a statutory right to appeal is reviewed de novo.
- A knowing and voluntary waiver of statutory rights to appeal a sentence is valid.
- The scope of a waiver in a plea agreement is subject to the same rules of interpretation as used for any other contract (at least, “for the most part”).
- Any ambiguity will be construed against the drafter (usually, the government).
It’s the last of these that allows Cope to reach the merits of his challenge to the length of his supervised release. Because part of the language defining the scope of Cope’s waiver - which waived appeal of any sentence “within or below the range corresponding to the determined total offense level and criminal history category” - defines a non-appealable sentence in terms of criteria that apply only to the term of imprisonment, and not to the term of the supervised release, the court finds the provision ambiguous and construes it against the government:
As drafted, however, this provision cannot sensibly be applied to a term of supervised release. Under the Sentencing Guidelines, the offense level and criminal history category do not control the term of supervised release, as they do the term of imprisonment. Rather, the type of offense determines the length of the Guidelines range for the term of supervised release. See U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2(a) (Nov. 2002) (specifying supervised release range for Class C felonies); 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(3) (Class C felony defined as a crime with a maximum term of imprisonment between 10 and 25 years); 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2) (2003) (maximum term for Cope?s crime is 20 years). This ambiguity in the waiver provision makes it impossible for us to determine whether the prerequisites for waiver have been met with regard to Cope?s term of supervised release. Because we ?steadfastly? apply the rule that ?any lack of clarity? in a plea agreement should be construed against the government as drafter, [citation], we hold that this ambiguity in the waiver provision permits Cope to appeal the length of his term of supervised release.
It does Cope little good in the end, however. While the court entertains his appeal, it affirms the lifetime supervised release.
Search Blog Directory: