Appellate Law

CA1: does everyone get Brady wrong?

By S. COTUS

US v. Aviles-Colon, Nos. 05-1384, 05-2039, 05-2040.  In this Puerto Rican drug distribution case, the First remands on a Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) issue as to one defendant. 

A year after the trial in this case, a DEA report was obtained which the defendant says is Brady material.  But, the District Court used the wrong standard in denying the motion for a new trial.  t said that the suppressed evidence "does not rise to the level of materiality that would be likely to cause a different result at a new trial."  That isn?t the standard.   The standard is ?was a reasonable probability of a different outcome, which is "shown when the government's evidentiary suppression 'undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.'" But, the First says that none of this matters because the information in the reports on their own, could have been used for impeachment since it details a lot of the motives of the various players.

The First also goes through what needs to be shown to admit co-conspirator testimony.  The First explains that under its law 1) government agents are conspirators; and 2) ?informing co-conspirators of the activities of the conspiracy's members furthers the conspiracy.? 

As always, the First says that prosecutors should not ?appeal to the "jury's emotions and role as the conscience of the community."  But, as always, it really means ?go ahead and do it.?  So, it finds that the prosecutor?s comments were not that bad.  That is the usual stuff.  Some of the other claims of prosecutorial misconduct don?t have merit (i.e. saying that they are ?fortunate? to have a gang member testify). 

There are a lot of other typical issues, but they don?t really create any new law.  But, for those that practice in this area, this case will be of interest.  Otherwise, there is a spreadsheet at the end, explaining what is up with each case.

Full post as published by Appellate Law and Practice on July 31, 2008 (boomark / email).