Academic

Six by Bebchuk

By Lawrence Solum

Yesterday, Lucien Bebchuk (Harvard) uploaded six new papers to SSRN:

Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers (forthcoming Yale Law Journal):

This paper proposes two objectives - undistorted choice and equal treatment - for the legal rules governing corporate acquisitions in general, and corporate takeovers in particular. Undistorted choice is essential to the efficient operation of the market for corporate assets and that equal treatment is suggested by both efficiency and fairness considerations. Current takeover rules, I argue, lead to distorted choice and unequal treatment. I therefore put forward a set of rules that would ensure undistorted choice and equal treatment in corporate takeovers without creating any significant efficiency costs. Although the analysis focuses on takeovers, it also considers the legal rules that should govern other methods of corporate acquisition.

Away from Distorted Choice and Unequal Treatment in the Market for Corporate Control (forthcoming Harvard Law Review:

Two goals - undistorted choice and equal treatment - for the legal rules governing corporate acquisitions in general, and corporate takeovers in particular are discussed in this paper. Current takeover rules, I argue, lead to distorted choice and unequal treatment. I therefore put forward a set of rules that would ensure undistorted choice and equal treatment in corporate takeovers without creating any significant efficiency costs. Although the analysis focuses on takeovers, it also considers the legal rules that should govern other methods of corporate acquisition. Undistorted choice is essential to the efficient operation of the market for corporate assets and that equal treatment is suggested by both efficiency and fairness considerations.

Inequality of Treatment and Choice Distortion: the Context of Corporate Acquisitions (forthcoming Journal of Legal Studies):

Current takeover rules, I argue, lead to distorted choice and unequal treatment. I therefore put forward a set of rules that would ensure undistorted choice and equal treatment in corporate takeovers without creating any significant efficiency costs. I demonstrate that corporate takeover policy should be constrained by two goals - undistorted choice and equal treatment - for the legal rules governing corporate acquisitions in general, and corporate takeovers in particular are discussed in this paper. The analysis also considers the legal rules that should govern other methods of corporate acquisition. The efficient operation of the of the market for corporate assets requires undiistorted choice and that equal treatment is suggested by both efficiency and fairness considerations.

Corporate Control Markets: An Analysis of Equality and Choice (forthcoming Journal of Law and Economics):

The efficient operation of the of the market for corporate assets requires undiistorted choice and that equal treatment is suggested by both efficiency and fairness considerations.  Current takeover rules, I argue, lead to distorted choice and unequal treatment. I therefore put forward a set of rules that would ensure undistorted choice and equal treatment in corporate takeovers without creating any significant efficiency costs. The analysis also considers the legal rules that should govern other methods of corporate acquisition.  I demonstrate that corporate takeover policy should be constrained by two goals - undistorted choice and equal treatment - for the legal rules governing corporate acquisitions in general, and corporate takeovers in particular are discussed in this paper.

Unequal Treatment and Distorted Choice: Structuring the Market for Corproate Control with Special Reference to Endogenous and Exogenous Factors (forthcoming Journal of Finance):

Current takeover rules, this paper argues, lead to distorted choice and unequal treatment when either exogenous or endogenous variables are considered. I therefore put forward a set of rules that would ensure undistorted choice and equal treatment in corporate takeovers without creating any significant efficiency costs. Although the analysis focuses on takeovers, it also considers the legal rules that should govern other methods of corporate acquisition. I propose two objectives - undistorted choice and equal treatment - for the legal rules governing corporate acquisitions in general, and corporate takeovers in particular. Undistorted choice is essential to the efficient operation of the market for corporate assets and that equal treatment is suggested by both efficiency and fairness considerations.

Taking Corporations Over, Seriously!  The Sovereign Virtues of Undistorted Choice and Equality (forthcoming Legal Theory):

The theory that best fits and justifies corporate law as a whole includes two principles that are implicit in the legal rules governing the general phenomenon of corporate acquisitions and corporate takeovers in particular.  The first principle is the principle of undistorted choice.  The second principle is the principle of equal treatment. Equal treatment is suggested by both equal respect for the welfare of each person.  Undistorted choice is essential to the fair operation of the market for corporate assets.  Current takeover rules lead to distorted choice and unequal treatment. As a consequence, an ideal judge would derive a set of rules that would ensure undistorted choice and equal treatment in corporate takeovers without creating any significant efficiency costs. Although these principles are derived from the context of takeovers, a similar analysis would derive similar principles for other methods of corporate acquisition.

All six papers are highly recommended.  Bebchuk's prodigious output is truly amazing.

Full post as published by Legal Theory Blog on April 01, 2008 (boomark / email).