Anonymous thus presents a new form of institutionalized governance that appears to embody in a new form the consequences of the movement toward mass democracy a century in the making. It represents disorganized organization, a potential state always at the ready, that becomes whole for brief periods and against specific objectives. It is governance without either government or apparatus (institution). It is activated by the processing of judgments that derive from its monitoring. Anonymous suggests Foucault's gaze turned outward. The inmates of the Panopticon do not merely monitor inward (themselves), they monitor outward as well (the people and institutional structures around them). Now better understood through the less threatening language of "transparency", the (self) governance effects can be profound. Cf., Matt Hannah, "Imperfect Panopticism: Envisioning the Construction of Normal Lives," in
Space and Social Theory: Interpreting Modernity and Postmodernity 344 (Georges Benko & Ulf Strohmeyer, eds., Oxford: Blackwell, 1997). There is a sense of this in the pivotal role that non-governmental organizations already play int he construction and maintenance of non-state governance regimes. See, Larry Catá Backer,
From Moral Obligation to International Law: Disclosure Systems, Markets and the Regulation of Multinational Corporations. Georgetown Journal of International Law, Vol. 39, 2008.
Its form is discerned by the strong framework provided through a shared set of beliefs. This is not a singular ideological frame, but a cluster of sub-frames. Anonymous embraces a core ideology with a large number of more specifically applicable sub-ideologies (or consequerntialist ideologies). These ideologies are consequentialist in the sense that they provide the means for measuring the actions of others and for assessing the legitimacy and possibility objective for which of mass mobilization is necessary and the collective aroused. Yet its strength, in shared ideology, may also prove its weak point. Ideology might roam freely through mass movement communities. But it is also something to which many contribute. One can expect that if ideology triggers mobilization and determines both its character and objectives, the power to move ideology, even a little bit, would be quite important. See generally, Pierre Bourdieu, "The Market of Symbolic Goods," in The Field of Cultural Production 112-141(Randall Johnson, ed., New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). But, even within a more conventional multi-institutional transnational context, that is a project shared by many with diverse and antagonistic positions. See, Larry Catá Backer, Economic Globalization and the Rise of Efficient Systems of Global Private Lawmaking: Wal-Mart as Global Legislator. University of Connecticut Law Review, Vol. 39, No. 4, 2007.
As the actualization, at least in very early form, of what may be a new form of non-state actor with governance power (and certainly with the ability to project power against other non-state actors and even against states) the constellation of mass mobilization known as "Anonymous" is worth considering. That cross border mass mobilization is possible, and can be made effective against state and non-state actors, that such mobilizations can be harassed through the articulation of praxis oriented application of commonly embraced ideology that are substantially similar to those that support the legitimacy of state action, suggests the power of this form of governance organization, its strengths and weaknesses. Like spiderweb, it is easy to pierce when considered from the perspective of the conventional organization of governance units. But like spider web it can be quite strong when invoked for the limited and transitory objectives for which mobilization based action is organized. Though the current interactions between this aggregation and states over the Wikileaks disclosures will likely be managed away, the form of this framework for governance will not.
One of my students, Robert Marriott, has undertaken some research on Anonymous. He has agreed to share an essay reflecting his work, which is reproduced below. The essay follows:
The Problems and Perspectives of Anonymous as a criminal entity
Robert Marriott
Several hosting and payment company websites were recently attacked by the internet group Anonymous under the banner of ?Operation Payback?, an attempt to show solidarity and lend support to Julian Assange and Wikileaks in light of Assange?s recent arrest and the substantial part of the media which has cast the site?s recent activities in a derogatory light. Each of these sites had responded to soft pressure and requests from US Government officials to stop supporting Wikileaks. Although the attacks did temporarily shut down some sites and brought about policy reversals in a couple of cases, they generally did not cause substantial damage, and did lead Assange to publicly distance himself from Anonymous and its tactics. Anonymous is now working to disseminate the diplomatic cables Wikileaks has released as widely across the web as possible, usually by legal if not entirely orthodox means. The capacity of Anonymous and similar organizations to commit legal acts of protest, and criminal acts poses novel and substantial challenges to effective governance on an international scale. This essay will focus upon the history and development of Anonymous as a decentralized group, the merits and demerits of arguments describing Project Payback as a valid of civil protest, and the effectiveness of different responses to Anonymous by government agents seeking to reduce their potential impact.
Anonymous originated among the users of an imageboard (a BBS that permits image posting) called 4chan. Individuals posting to 4chan are not identified unless they choose to give themselves a nickname- hence, ?anonymous?. Even before the emergence of Anonymous as a broader entity, ideas and figures of speech from 4chan would frequently find their way into broader internet culture, and conversation on the board could, in a matter of minutes, use and discard a large number of topics in a complex interplay of a variety of memes and in-jokes. Among the sections of the website, the most infamous was /b/, the Random board. This section is almost completely unmoderated, and became known as a place where the most profane and uncensored sort of discussion could take place, involving depraved conversation topics and the use of graphic ?shock? images to troll other users and attract attention to the original poster. To give an example, it was not until after several years of community infighting and external legal pressure that images of child pornography were universally banned from the site. This ban, and other internal disputes, would also lead to the creation of a large number of similar imageboards that catered to 4chan users who also had other interests, or simply to create a parallel community. Individuals who used any of these boards can be seen as the first members of Anonymous. This definition still holds: individuals who use the boards are Anonymous, despite no affiliation with cyberattacks or criminal activity. The fact that many Anonymous members do nothing illegal and are involved in no protest movements can make discussing the criminal acts of some members of Anonymous difficult; from this point forward the reader may assume that Anonymous refers only to those members of the group whom are either involved in some form of illegal activity as part of the group, or are members of one of its protest movements, or both.
The first raids by members of Anonymous were carried out against websites that were seen as wronging the 4chan community in some way, such as by stealing content generated by users, or against individuals whom posters on /b/ found offensive, such as an individuals who posted footage of cruelty to animals. A ?raid? could employ any number of methods, including locating and publicizing a target?s personal contact information, reporting the target to the authorities for real or fabricated offenses, or cyberattacks that seek to disable the target?s activities online. Although these early raids were partially retributive in nature, another major motivation was ?lulz?, a variation of LOL meant to indicate a sort of schadenfreude. A frequent justification for a raid or other attack came to be that it was done ?for the lulz?, alongside any other moral gloss that the situation provided. At no time did these attacks represent any consistent moral or social system of norms by the community; rather, they were acts of opportunity by individuals who felt protected by their anonymity online, and empowered by the society they had found in their community. Targets were selected largely based upon popular consensus, which varied intensely; if Anonymous attacked a man in Nebraska for setting his cat on fire one week, the next they might ignore or take amusement in posted videos of similar animal torture from another source. For years, these attacks occurred with only sporadic media coverage. Generally, it appeared to be understood that publicity was counterproductive- when members of the media reported on Anonymous, it tended to attract new users to the board, and members of the group reveled in the mistakes members of the press made in describing the group.