Religion & Law

Over the weekend I participated in some fascinating conversations at Marquette as part of a conference on social justice organized by Christopher Wolfe.  With folks like Jean Bethke Elshtain, Nicholas Wolterstorff, and John Finnis in the lineup, I (wisely) did more listening than talking.  I found Wolterstorff's exploration of social justice to be especially interesting.  Building on his previous work on justice, he reminded us that justice is not equality in the assignment of benefits and burdens (as Aristotle would have it), but the rendering to each what he is due (i.e., the goods to which he has a right).  Social justice requires us to focus on laws and social practices that create patterns by which members of a community are deprived of their rights, beyond particular instances of injustice.  (For what it's worth, John Finnis agreed with this definition of social justice.)  Wolterstorff also noted that opposition to "social justice" arises from a variety of concerns: 1) Concern about separating patterns of injustice from the intentions of those contributing to the patterns.  As he pointed out, justice does not track with culpability.  We can wrong someone without having blameworthy intentions.  2) Concern that the state is the prime mover on social justice issues.  He emphasized that recognizing social injustice does not carry implications as to remedy.  3) The deepest source of resistance, in Wolterstorff's view, is that our acknowledgment of responsibility for social injustice requires that we stop the practice at issue, and that's hard to do for those who benefit from the status quo.

My own contribution was less ambitious, as I was invited to defend faith-based initiatives against criticism that such programs are inconsistent with the demands of justice, properly understood.  I hope to post the whole thing here at some point, but for now, here's a short excerpt that captures my thesis:

Religious belief can provide a foundation for relationships of personal care and concern animated by love.  The state does not appear to have the moral resources to build into its provision of welfare services the aspirational commitments needed for a love relationship, but the state should care that the needy are being loved in this way.