Religion & Law

Robby is right that I did not intend to weigh in on the Alvare, Commonweal debate.  I was primarily interested in the question raised in the editors' post and was relying on their characterization of Alvare's argument (which I have not yet read).  I do think, though, that the position (which I'm glad to see Robby agrees with) that the bishops' legal interpretations or empirical policy predictions are not entitled to uncritical deference is not wholly uncontroversial.  In a different NCR article, John Allen reported on the "gap" that has emerged between the USCCB and the Catholic Health Association over health care reform.  The article included this back and forth between Cardinal George and the CHA:

CHA officials also insist that their rift with the bishops was narrow.

"We did not differ on the moral question, or the teaching authority of the bishops," Keehan said.

George, however, isn't so sure.

"This may be a narrow disagreement, but it has exposed a very large principle," he said.

The principle is ecclesiological: Who speaks for the church on matters of faith and morals, including how morality is translated into law?

"If the bishops have a right and a duty to teach that killing the unborn is immoral, they also have to teach that laws which permit and fund abortion are immoral," George said. "It seems that what some people are saying is that the bishops can't, or shouldn't, speak to the moral content of the law, that we should remain on the level of abstract principles."

That's a point, George argued, with implications across the board.

"For example, it affects our discussion of immigration," he said. "Are we supposed to just say that the present situation is morally unjustified, or do we have the right and the duty to make moral judgments about whatever legislation comes down the line?"

The challenge of navigating those two outlooks has already complicated one effort at reconciliation.

George (the Cardinal, not Robby) seems to be suggesting -- though he's far from clear on this point -- that the bishops' authority to teach about faith and morals, if it's to be effective, must also include authority to determine the moral valence of a particular piece of legislation.  Now, his words might be simply mean that the bishops are entitled to weigh in on the question.  If so, they would be consistent with the point of my original post.  But that is not at least how Allen seems to have interpreted Cardinal George's comments, because otherwise the back-and-forth he sets up between CHA and the bishops (indeed, the entire "gap" referenced in the article) collapses.  No one, as far as I know, is saying that the bishops are not entitled to take a position on the consequences of legislation.  CHA (and the sisters) are just saying its ok for Catholics to disagree with the bishops' prediction of those consequences, as long as they don't simultaneously reject the Church's position on the underlying moral principles.  

In the same article, Allen also reports this statement by Bishop Lynch, of St. Petersburg:

"I've been associated in one way or another with the episcopal conference of the United States since 1972," said Bishop Robert Lynch of St. Petersburg, Fla. "I have never before this year heard the theory that we enjoy the same primacy of respect for legislative interpretation as we do for interpretation of the moral law."  Lynch, who sits on the CHA Board of Trustees, spoke in a June 13 interview with NCR on the margins of the Denver conference.

Again, this comment, though a bit opaque, suggests that Bishop Lynch has, for the first time this year, heard people (bishops? someone else?) argue that bishops enjoy some sort of "primacy" with respect to "legislative interpretation."  This is consistent with the more expansive reading of Cardinal George's comments, and inconsistent with the notion that the position I am arguing for remains uncontroversial, at least in some circles.