Home -> Law Blog Directory -> Administrative Law Blogs -> Within the Scope

Administrative Law

: Within the Scope

Reading Table: 3 Worthwhile Additions

By Eric L. Lipman

Among the Administrative Law articles posted to the Social Science Research Network this week are a trio of interesting items, any one of which would be worth some space on your reading table. The articles include:

n Admin Law's Federalism: Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, from Professors Brian D. Galle and Mark Seidenfeld, of the Florida State University College of Law. Galle and Seidenfeld contend that the ?modern doctrine towards requiring in all cases clear congressional authorization for preemption or other expansions of federal power is mistaken,? and in many cases, yields a ?negligible, or downright counter-productive? result. More strikingly still, the duo maintain that when assessing the constitutional values implicated by federal regulations which preempt state law, ?agencies are in many contexts better suited to consider federalism concerns than is Congress, or, for that matter, the federal judiciary.? As Galle and Seidenfeld reason, the constitutional values at stake in such a conflict will often ?depend on the kind of policy judgments at which agencies are most skilled.?

The complete article is accessible here.

n Privatization of State Administrative Services, from Professor Drury D. Stevenson, of the South Texas College of Law.

Professor Stevenson takes a critical look at recent privatization efforts and challenges popular notions that ?contracts with the government can ever function with free market ideals? or that ?harnessing free-market forces will enhance the efficiency and productivity of government agencies, by replacing the bureaucracy with profit-motivated workers.? Among his critiques is that ?Government agencies and programs can be massive compared to the average firm, and there are few companies large enough to take on the work of an agency when it wants to privatize some of its functions.? Concludes Stevenson, ?[i]n the end, it is not clear that we were any worse off having civil servants within the traditional bureaucracy perform the government?s tasks.?

The complete article is accessible here.

n Independent Agencies and the Unitary Executive Debate: An Empirical Critique, from Professor Adam Candeub of the Michigan State University College of Law and Keith S. Brown of the CNA Corporation.

Continuing their earlier work plumbing the database of more than 8,200 votes cast by members of the Federal Communications Commission, Candeub and Brown argue that the highly-personal policy agendas pursued by members of independent commissions tends to blunt both the reach of Presidential and Congressional power ? and with it, sources of democratic accountability. Write Candeub and Brown: ?Congress is at least accountable to some of the voters; commissioners are beholden only to their political sponsors, as well as their sponsors in industry and other special interests?. These ?micro-institutional? features emerge as the drivers of agency behavior, not the President or Congress (at least directly).?

The complete article is accessible here.

Full post as published by Within the Scope on March 09, 2008 (boomark / email).