Religion & Law

Thanks, as always, to Bob for the interesting conversation.  A few quick (but, I hope, not too quick!) thoughts in response:

First, Bob asks:

Why would we ever think that assisting the poor in the purchase of what the non-poor already purchase -- comprehensive health insurance policies -- would entrench the constitutionally permissive abortion regime?  If we're actually concerned with the entrenching effects that private-market-offered health insurance policies, most all of which cover abortion, have on the legal regime concerning abortion, why don't we call for regulation of those insurance companies, all of which currently enjoy statutory exemption from federal regulation, requiring them to offer policies that do not cover abortions in addition to what ever policies they offer that do cover abortions?

The second sentence raises (to me) interesting questions about the relevance of the fact that, under the proposed health-insurance proposals, people would be required to buy insurance.  But Bob's main question, it seems to me, is in the first sentence:  My thoughts (which might be mistaken, of course) are that we might very well think that increasing the extent to which the government helps to create expectations regarding the availability of (indirectly subsidized) abortions might well help to entrench the current legal regime.  Additionally, I worry that the political experience of all this -- that is, the experience of seeing that the prospect of increased regulations of (or, reduced indirect subsidization of) abortion is so unacceptable to the Democratic leadership that many of them seem willing to risk  losing the opportunity to enact the President's signature piece of legislation -- could, for many, result in a hardening of their attachment to the idea of constitutionally protected abortion rights.  Is this a "speculative" concern?  Absolutely.  I'm not sure.  But, I worry about it.  (Some, of course -- Michael Sean Winters, over at America, for example -- think it will have the opposite effect.  I hope he is right!).

With respect to his second point -- about the best terminology to use -- I guess it is not clear to me that "subsidy" necessary says anything about intent, but I don't have any objections to the terms he usees . . . so long as we do not forget that for many (most?) of the Democrats in Congress, it is a desired side-effect of this legislation that access will be increased to abortion-services.  I understand, of course, that Bob and I are in the same place, and regret equally any such side-effects of health-insurance regulation.

Finally, I certainly hope that neither Bob nor anyone else "heard" me to be saying that the intent / double-effect questions are not interesting or important.  Yes, absolutely, a conscientious legislator would need to engage these questions.  My point is just that I am happy to assume, for the sake of discussion, that a pro-life, conscientious legislator could in good faith come to the conclusion that he or she is not culpable for any bad abortion-related side-effects of what he or she thinks is, on balance, a good piece of policy.  That such a legislator could avoid culpability, though, would not mean -- it seems to me -- that there are not serious pro-life concerns about the enactment of the policy.