International Law

Gordon Brown maintains the dilution the Wilson Doctrine again

Buried amongst the flurry of Government publications on the last day before the deliberately extended Parliamentary Summer to Autumn Recess, was Prime Minister Gordon Brown's latest utterance on the Wilson Doctrine.

UPDATE: there were, by our count, an astonishing 1463 Parliamentary Written Answers published on this Last Day Before the Summer Recess. Are we seriously meant to believe that none of these Answers were ready for publication in the days and weeks beforehand ?

HC Deb, 21 July 2009, c1166W

Members: Surveillance

Prime Minister

Written answers and statements, 21 July 2009

David Davis (Haltemprice & Howden, Conservative)

To ask the Prime Minister whether any hon. Member has been subject to (a) official surveillance and (b) interception of communications in the last two years.

Gordon Brown (Prime Minister, No Department; Kirkcaldy & Cowdenbeath, Labour)

The Wilson doctrine continues to apply to all forms of surveillance and interception that are subject to authorisation by Secretary of State warrant.

Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson's original Wilson Doctrine covered all telephone interception / phone tapping / bugging of Members of Parliament.

The Sadiq Khan MP / Babar Ahmad electronic bugging in Prison affair saw Gordon Brown's henchmen Jack Straw (Justice) and Jacqui Smith (Home Office) slither around the Wilson Doctrine, because, under the Police Act 1997 Part III, there is no need for a Warrant signed by a Secretary State. The self -authorisation for such intrusive surveillance is done at the Superintendent / Deputy Chief Constable level. - see: "Report on two visits by Sadiq Khan MP to Babar Ahmad at HM Prison Woodhill" - Rt. Hon. Sir Christopher Rose finds no illegality

Since all Government statements about the "Wilson Doctrine" are deliberately vague and evasive, you have to read them as if they came from the Soviet Politburo, and see what they do not explicitly say or mention.

"all forms of surveillance and interception that are subject to authorisation by Secretary of State warrant" only applies to:

1. Interception of Communications (electronic or postal) under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 Part 1 Chapter 1., which requires a Warrant or a Certificate signed by a Secretary of State (either the Home Secretary or the Foreign Secretary, usually)

2. A property interference and / or interference with wireless telegraphy warrant under the Intelligence Services Act 1994 sections 5 to 7

The "Wilson Doctrine" is important, not because it might allow a minority of Members of Parliament should be able to hide any shady business dealings or scandalous private lives, but because it should prevent the over powerful tentacles of the Government and State bureaucracy from snooping on their political opponents (within their own political party and the opposition parties) and breaking the anonymity and confidentiality of meetings, correspondence and electronic communications between a Member of Parliament and his or her Constituents, or other members of the public, who they are elected to serve, and champion against the Government and the bureaucracy etc. if necessary.

However, by restricting it to the two legal requirements listed above, it does mean that Members of Parliament and their constituents have may have been snooped on by:

• GCHQ or any other public body authorised to intercept electronic communications, not via a Warrant but via a more general Certificate (e.g. for snooping, in bulk, on transatlantic fibre optic cables or satellite communications)

• Police units using the Police Act 1997 Part III powers
  
  
  
  • Property Interference i.e. authorised breaking and entering into homes or vehicles, usually to plant electronic bugging or tracking devices.
    

• Police or intelligence agency units using the rest of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 for: the various kinds of Surveillance:
  • Directed Surveillance

  • Covert Surveillance

  • Intrusive Surveillance
    
    
  • The use of Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS) - informants and infiltrators
  • Seizure of cryptographic keys and / or de-crypted plaintext.

  • Communications Data:
    
    
    
    • Subscriber Details - Name and Address of land line or registered mobile phones<

    • Location Based Services Data (instantaneous and historical tracking of mobile phone handsets)

    • Communications Traffic Data (itemised phone bills, who called who and when "friendship trees", email server logfiles, internet access log files etc.
      

The Police or Military covert surveillance units (but not the Intelligence Agencies, without a Warrant) could also use the Counter Terrorism Act 2008 section 18 Material not subject to existing statutory restrictions

• DNA or fingerprint samples obtained in secret, through Property Interference or by Confidential Human Intelligence Sources
  

There are "official surveillance" techniques and Databases which are not covered by RIPA e.g.

• Automatic Number Plate Recognition (the Metropolitan Police have access to all of the Transport for London Congestion Charge ANPR data "in bulk, in real time", exempt from the Data Protection Act).

• Passenger Name Records, credit card and email details data slurped from Airline, Train and Ferry Booking Systems

• Transport for London Oyster Travel Smart Card data

• The planned National Identity Register / ID Card scheme

• Literally millions of CCTV surveillance cameras and recording devices
  

There are also other Government Departments which have granted themselves snooping powers, which fall outside of the RIPA or Intelligence Services legal frameworks:

• HM Treasury can demand "any document" by invoking the words "money laundering" or "terrorism finance"

• The Department for Work and Pensions employs thousands of "benefits fraud" investigators, and abuses the Social Security Act 2003 to get hold of Communications Data , without having to pay for it, which they would have to do under RIPA.

• Private companies designated as "anti-fraud organisations" under the Serious Crime Act 2007 can get hold of MPs' or Constituents' financial or medical data -- The next Home Office data security and privacy disaster ? Sharing all our financial details with private sector "specified anti-fraud organisations"
  

None of the above, apart from items 1 and 2, "are subject to authorisation by Secretary of State warrant"

Full post as published by Spy Blog on July 25, 2009 (boomark / email).