Ethics

Upcoming Talks at Oxford

By Adam Kolber

This Friday, July 3, I'll be giving two talks at Oxford.  As always, Neuroethics & Law Blog readers in attendance are encouraged to introduce themselves.

The first, "Neurotechnology and Subjective Experience," will be held at 2pm at the Oxford Centre for Functional MRI of the Brain. 

The second, "Why Retributivists Must Abolish Prison," will be held at the Old Indian Institute and is sponsored by the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics.  Here is some more information on the second talk:

Friday 3 July, 4.00 p.m. - 5.30 p.m.
Why Retributivists Must Abolish Prison
Adam Kolber, Professor of Law, University of San Diego

Strong retributivists hold that we are obligated to punish offenders in proportion to their blameworthiness.  There are two principal reasons, however, why this view is inconsistent with our prison sentencing policies.  First, our sentencing policies usually ignore variation in prisoners' subjective experiences of incarceration.  Two people may commit offenses that make them equally blameworthy.  Yet, even if they receive equal terms of incarceration, the prisoner with more difficulty adapting to prison is likely to be punished more severely than the prisoner who adapts more readily.  Second, our sentencing policies neglect to consider variation in offenders' baseline conditions.  An offender with greater liberty or subjective well-being outside of prison is likely to be punished more by a particular term in prison than an offender with a worse baseline condition, even when the offenders are equally blameworthy.  In both of these examples, offenders may be equally blameworthy yet receive unequal punishments. 

Our sentencing policies generally ignore (and often strive to ignore) variation in both offenders' baseline conditions and their punishment experiences, even though such variation must be considered in order to satisfy retributivist commitments to proportional punishment.  While we can imagine creating prison sentencing policies that actually do take into account pertinent variation among offenders, such policies are impractical and likely to have few proponents.  I will, therefore, argue that strong retributivists, and perhaps all retributivists, must cease support for incarceration.  (For background reading, see http://ssrn.com/abstract=1090337 and http://ssrn.com/abstract=1266158.)

Full post as published by Neuroethics and Law on July 01, 2009 (boomark / email).