Ethics

TERRY A. MARONEY, Vanderbilt University - School of Law
ABSTRACT: Developmental neuroscience is fast generating new findings about the teen brain. Many advocates, defenders, and commentators believe that such findings strongly influenced elimination of the juvenile death penalty and now seek to expand their reach. This Article is the first to take a systematic look at how, since Roper v. Simmons, arguments based in developmental neuroscience are faring in practice. It demonstrates that brain science has had little meaningful impact on juvenile justice in the courts. Close analysis of the cases reveals many doctrinal hurdles, posed primarily by relatively thin prevailing conceptions of sentence proportionality and mens rea, and some opportunities, particularly in the realm of individualized sentencing. More, whether a decision-maker is disposed to credit the insights of adolescent brain science appears to be driven by precommitments. Close analysis of the science?as well as the manner in which it is being presented?reveals further obstacles, both practical and theoretical, as well as some opportunities for that science to inform assessment of group tendencies. This Article concludes that high hopes for adolescent brain science have been, and are likely to remain, largely unrealized. Although there is a theoretically defensible role for that science going forward, that role is a limited one. Advances in developmental neuroscience do not alter and, indeed, tend to reinforce a social commitment to treat youth differently. Courts, theorists, and advocates?but most importantly legislatures?therefore should take note of it as one reason among many to recommit to a balanced system of juvenile justice. To put greater weight on the science is, at this moment, unnecessary and unwise.