* * * By Brett D. Sherman; The Sherman Law FirmSubprime lending on a massive scale always had a limited shelf life. The only reason it worked at all was an unprecented and clearly temporary confluence of conditions:
Confluence is a great word. It means, in essence, a "coming together." Most often the term confluence is used in connection with rivers. Probably, the most famous confluence of rivers is in Pittsburgh where three major American rivers eventually become one somewhere around the Steel city's semi-famous (at least to geography buffs) golden triangle. One gold star goes to the first person who can name the big three rivers. But I digress.
I was referring to a vert rare confluence (coming together) of economic conditions. These days, Wall Street executives frequently invoke terms like hundred year storm, perfect storm, and act of god when they cross their fingers and deny responsibility they certainly deserve for pocketing millions and millions of dollars as a reward for threatening the future of the the entire world economy. The confluence of economic conditions that Wall Street happily exploited was truly a hundred year storm.
Okay, enough stalling by me. But you all know the story already anyway -
First, the combination of the bursting internet stock bubble followed by the humongous shock the the U.S. economy from the September 11 terror attacks resulted in historically low interest rates that remained historically low longer than ever before;
Second, low interest rates meant Treasury yields were so low that bond funds and other major instituions needed investment grade instruments with significantly higher returns than United States bonds in order to avoid having to invade fund principals to make required payouts to investors (expansion on this topic requires its own blog post). For purposes of this post, it is only necessary to understand that fixed-income fund managers, managers pension fund managers, and institutions that were restricted to investment grade securities were desperate for yield. This is situation, if not unprecented (I am a lawyer, not an economist) is extremely unusual.
Third-Again thanks to low rates, money was so easy and cheap to borrow - especially for banks - that it was practically free.
FourthCheap money (low interest rates) almost always are manna for the housing industry. Easy credit and low interest rates (and a host of similar factors to long to spell out here) allowed people to afford monthly mortgage payments on homes they never thought they would be able to afford. People like living large. Housing went through the roof, and people accumulated amazing amounts of home equity (sometimes called found money) due to the increasing value of their homes. In short, most individuals could tap into the wealth produced by their homes to avoid possible mortgage delinquincies (and to put in pools, surround sound, etc.).
Fifth (and you thought the confluence of three rivers in Pittsburgh was impressive), broker-dealers like Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers were very experienced with a set of financial products that, in distinct cycles that (get ready to be shocked) more or less cooled off or heated up during the 80's and 90's in periods of rising or falling interest rates. These products are called mortgage-backed securities, and similar investments like the forerunner of the modern CDO. Perhaps you've heard of them.
If Wall Street excels at anything, it is spotting an opportunity to exploit others for profit. In this case, subprime borrowers, many of whom would eventually face disaster, and fund managers (including international institutions and foreign governments) were to be two classes of victims. If... if... if only Wall Street could get investment grade ratings with securities made from pools of less than investment grade quality mortgages. Enter the quants (actually, they had been working on this stuff for a while already). With complex mathematical computer programs, and a lot of money in "fees," investment banks were able to convince, err, obtain the coveted and often required investment grade stamp of approval. To paraphrase Dick Fuld and Jimmy Cayne - CHA-CHING. As long as there were millions of mortgages to securitze and get rid of without too many defaults and foreclosures, the immediate future (which is all Wall Street cared about) was bright, particularly for the old hands Fuld and Cayne.
Sixth (yep, the confluence of economic conditions continues), the extremely lax regulatory environment that prevailed since late in the Clinton Administration meant that Wall Street could fund (or buy) lenders that were willing to give just about anyone, including people with abysmal credit and/or no jobs a mortgage (the ever popular subprime and Alt-A mortgages).
The reason Wall Street elevated the subprime mortgage industry from relative obscurity to a household word (no pun intended) can be summed up in one word: PRODUCT. Wall Street's mortgage machine needed one thing - lots and lots of product, a/k/a mortgages to securitize and sell. With traditional lending standards in place (the kind of standards that required a 20% downpayment and a virtually spotless credit history), the number of new loan originations, including refinancings would dwindle much too quickly. But there were millions of potential subprime borrowers just waiting to be strong-armed into buying their dream homes. Many subprime borrowers probably never did figure out how they got six figure loans when just getting approved for a checking account could be an ordeal. Of course, it isn't exactly easy to turn down a banker in a suit from Men's Wearhouse (sp?) when he begs you to take a suitcase full of money.
The underlying factor that made subprime on a mass scale possible, and was the primary driver behind almost all of the elements of our confluence clearly was the combo of historically low interest rates. The whole drama never would have unfolded without its key player. You guessed it. The villians in this story are the investment banks. They figured out how to con everyone that securities made of manure somehow turned to gold. The key here was complexity. For a long time, almost nobody, regardless of their sophistication or their Harvard MBA, could figure out just what was going on because (a) Wall Street wanted it that way (hence the phrase lack of transparency) and, (b) it was therefore practically impossible for experts to understand the supposed distribution of risks within the "tranche system" of mortgage-backed securities and their big cousins the CDOs with enough clarity to even think of an argument why Wall Street's confident, silver-tongued pushers might be wrong when they prounounced MBS low risk investments.
In sum, Bear, Lehman and friends knew they had at least a couple of years of solid gold ahead of them and very few people knew they were making garbage loans and selling garbage securites. Wall Street could smell the money coming in for next few years. As for the long-term, well, what was that?
When interest rates rose - as Wall Street knew they eventually would - adjustable rate mortgages held by so many subprime borrowers adjusted right on up with them as soon as they reached their reset dates. This was a major problem for those who could just barely afford their mortgage payments at the original payment level. Rising rates ultimately would slow down, stall, and end the housing boom/bubble. The death of subprime wasn't just predictable, it was a sure thing from day one.
So why didn't the public - or even sophisticated fund managers get it? Because the whole enterprise was a scam, a con, and the people running the con - from lenders to investment bankers - had a vested interest in keeping the process as mysterious as possible.
At that, they unfortunately were quite successful.
The irony is that investment banks like Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns might have gotten away relatively unscathed if the money machine they invented and turned loose hadn't turned on them like Frankenstein's monster. But I am getting ahead of myself.
Here's the climax of the story. Nearly all of the biggest investment banks wound up the same toxic junk that they'd been selling to the public with the representation that MBS and CDOs were practically as safe as Treasuries. And the banks wound up with tons of the stuff. In some cases the reason was that the higher yield proved to big a temptation to resist and traders knowingly "drank the cool-aide" buying mortgage securities and financing them with, you guessed it, by jacking up leverage higher and higher. Other firms got stuck holding MBS that they had been unable to sell before Bear Stearns lit the fuse on the subprime crisis and blew the whole MBS market to kindom come.