Ethics

Anger or Moral Outrage? (Maibom)

By Heidi Maibom

It has long been debated whether anger is, or can be, a moral emotion. Seneca famously argued that we should rid ourselves of this emotion (On Anger). But although the fascination with Stoicism has very much survived into our century, few, if any, endorse the suggestion that we should rid ourselves of most emotions. Nevertheless, if there ever were a promising candidate for elimination, anger would seem to be it. The destructive effects of anger are depressingly abundant. Despite this, even Stoic specialists are apologists for anger. In her book on Stoicism and the military?Stoic Warriors?Nancy Sherman insists that anger should not be eliminated because some forms of it are ?constructive and healthy responses to injustice and wrongdoing? (67). Anger is OK when it is moral, e.g. when it is moral indignation or moral outrage. Anger at political states of affairs is commonly referred to as a prototypical of moral indignation. This ignores, of course, that one person?s injustice is another?s justice. Be that as it may, it is common to assume that there is a form of anger that is tracks the right sorts of things. Thus, Sherman concludes that: ?To feel outrage in bearing witness to torture, massacre, or rape is a fundamental response to human violation, and a fundamental way we protest the shame and abject servility that violence inflicts. These responses are a part of our humanity to cultivate, not excise.? (Sherman 2005, 89). (Notice that, ironically some of what we ought to be angry about are, themselves, the fruits of anger.) This sounds nice. But is it true? There are reasons to be doubtful.

In a recent issue of Journal of Experimental Social Psychology (45, 155-60), Daniel Batson?known for his influential empathy-altruism studies?and colleagues find little evidence of moral outrage. In a series of studies meant to measure people?s judgments of torture, they find little evidence that torture evokes much anger unless the subjects have some relation to the person tortured. This stands in contrast to people?s judgments of moral wrongness, which is unaffected by relationship. There is a only a weak correlation between such judgments and the feeling of anger. The study follows up on earlier studies of the relationship between unfairness judgments and anger (Batson et al. 2007). Here, too, Batson and colleagues found that anger correlates well with unfair treatment of cared-for others, but not with judgments of unfairness per se. The same is, of course, true of unfair treatment of the self. In other words, one may be aware of unfair treatment of, or severe pain being inflicted upon, others without feeling much, if any, anger at all unless that other is regarded as a cared for other.

Batson et al. introduce the concept of ?empathic anger? to capture anger at maltreatment of cared-for others. In some of their studies, empathy induction was used to produce anger at others? unfair treatment. One might, of course, wonder whether such anger ought to be regarded as empathic anger rather than just anger, since it is common to think that anger covers not just slights, insults, etc. to the self, but also to close others.  For instance, Richard Lazarus (1991) regards the core relational theme of anger to be ?a demeaning offence against me and mine? (122, my emphasis). Here, interestingly, Lazarus follows Aristotle in including close others?Aristotle talks of friends?as those offence against whom causes anger (Rhetoric). Does empathy induction serve to include others into one?s circle of friends or cared-for others? I don?t think we know. What we do know is that we are not likely to feel much anger at unfairness and harm to others, unless those others matter to us. Batson et al. conclude that there is currently little evidence in favor of anger being moral in nature, but caution that further research is needed.  

Now, this line of research gives rise to a lot of questions, and I do not expect the defenders of moral anger to be bowled over. They may, e.g., object to the construction of moral outrage as having the appraisal condition ?a fairness/harm (or just: moral) principle has been violated?. However, if Batson et al.?s studies are replicated and extended appropriately, we will have to face the fact that anger, as a response to wrongs, is limited in scope to the self and cared-for others (not humanity). And that seems to be a serious limitation. Now, some people believe that anger is concerned with specifically moral wrongs inflicted on the self and cared-for others. But anger often arises over issues that may have little moral import, but that nevertheless affects someone?s wellbeing negatively. So might anger be a more, if you like, nepotistic emotion responsive to certain forms of negative impacts on wellbeing? In that case, what would the moral objection to getting rid of anger amount to? Might Seneca have been right? Assuming that we can rid ourselves of anger without rather serious side-effects, should we?

[Aristotle: Collected Works of Aristotle, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1984. Daniel Batson et al.: Anger at unfairness: Is it moral outrage? European Journal of Social Psychology, 37, 1272-85 (2007). Daniel Batson et al.: Pursuing moral outrage: Anger at torture. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45, 155-60 (2009). Seneca: Moral and Political Essays, J. Cooper & J. Procope (Eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. Nancy Sherman: Stoic Warriors: The Ancient Philosophy Behind the Military Mind. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.]

Full post as published by Neuroethics and Law on March 30, 2009 (boomark / email).