Academic

Sartor on Defeasible Legal Reasoning

By Lawrence Solum

Giovanni Sartor (European University Institute Law Department) has posted Defeasibility in Legal Reasoning on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

I shall first introduce the idea of reasoning, and of defeasible reasoning in particular. I shall then argue that cognitive agents need to engage in defeasible reasoning for coping with a complex and changing environment. Consequently, defeasibility is needed in practical reasoning, and in particular in legal reasoning.

And from the paper:

The distinctive feature of a defeasible reasoning schema is that it may be defeated by further information to the contrary: The schema indicates a transition that only operates when one has no prevailing beliefs (or, more generally, mental states) against applying the schema or against adopting its conclusions. When one endorses the premises of a defeasible schema but has such prevailing beliefs to the contrary, one should refrain from adopting the conclusion of the schema (and withdraw that conclusion if one has already adopted in by instantiating that schema).

Interesting--somewhat technical, but rewarding. Recommended.

Full post as published by Legal Theory Blog on March 26, 2009 (boomark / email).