Patent Law

The IP Litigator's Holy Grail: Dismissal without Leave to Amend

By Les Weinstein, Michael Young, John Leo Wagner, Eric van Ginkel, and Victoria Pynchon

 (left, the victorious Karen R. Thorland of Loeb & Loeb)

Just as we're waxing philosophic about litigation's questionable ability to effectively and efficiently resolve a dispute requiring factual findings, along comes a ruling that not only resolves a mixed question of law and fact, but does so at the pleading stage without giving Plaintiff a chance to amend the Complaint.

Hearty congratulations to Karen R. Thorland of Loeb & Loeb LLP who pulled this rabbit out of the hat for BMG Music.  The new year just doesn't ever start better than that!

The Opinion in Brief 

In Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publishing, the Ninth Circuit held today that there was no set of facts which would permit the manufacturer and distributor of karaoke machines to make and sell its devices in the absence of reprint and synchronization licenses.  In concluding that the District Court properly granted defendant's motion to dismiss without leave to amend, the Ninth Circuit explained:

No amendment would change the conclusion that Leadsinger’s karaoke device falls within the definition of an audiovisual work and outside the scope of § 115’s compulsory licensing scheme. Indeed, the conclusion that Leadsinger’s device displays a series of related images that are intrinsically intended to be shown by a machine together with accompanying sounds is justified by Leadsinger’s own description of how its all-in-one microphone allows a consumer to sing lyrics “in real time” with recorded music.

Any amendment relating to Leadsinger’s purported fair use also would have been futile. Leadsinger’s allegations support that its use of copyrighted song lyrics is commercial, that song lyrics fall within the core of copyright protection, and we have drawn the reasonable inference that Leadsinger uses song lyrics in their entirety. Thus, the only possible amendment relating to fair use would address the harm to the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. That amendments relating to the fourth § 107 factor are a possibility is not enough to find that the district court abused its discretion given that the first three factors under § 107 unequivocally militate against a finding of fair use, and we are not to consider these factors in isolation. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591 n.21.

Full post as published by IP ADR Blog on January 02, 2008 (boomark / email).