Academic

Muniz-Fraticell on a Perpetual Constitution

By Lawrence Solum

Victor M. Muniz-Fraticelli (McGill University) has posted The Problem of a Perpetual Constitution (INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE, Axel Gosseries, Lukas Meyer, eds., Oxford University Press, 2009) on SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

A perpetual constitution aims to settle the political structure of a society and secure the rights of its citizens for an indefinite period of time, binding both present and future generations. Objections to the legitimacy of a perpetual constitution have been based on its supposed injustice to future generations, who would have had no part in enacting the constitution and would thus be precluded from choosing their own form of government. I argue in favor of the legitimacy of a perpetual constitution on three grounds: instrumental, normative, and ontological. On the first ground, a perpetual constitution is necessary to the pursuit of valuable public and personal endeavors. It not only prevents instability, but creates the conditions that enable individuals to engage in self-government and pursue future-oriented projects. On the second ground, a perpetual constitution can secure the bases of liberal legitimacy, the constitutional essentials that all reasonable citizens are expected to endorse. On the third ground, a perpetual constitution creates a collective agent - a people - from an aggregate of separate selves, each acting in their individual capacity. Constitutionalism makes the idea of a people intelligible.

Full post as published by Legal Theory Blog on January 20, 2009 (boomark / email).