Trademark Law

Applying Trademark Principles to Domain Disputes and Cybersquatting Matters.

One of the factors which must be proven in any trademark violation case, including cybersquatting actions, is that there is a likelihood of confusion caused by the alleged cybersquatters use of words or a logo. 

Likelihood of confusion exists when consumers viewing the mark would probably assume that the product or service it represents is associated with the source of a different product or service identified by a similar mark. Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 1229 (3^rd Cir. 1978). To prove a "likelihood of confusion," it is not necessary to prove actual confusion in the marketplace. It is enough to prove a "likelihood" that the unauthorized use will create confusion. Salton, Inc. v. Cornwall Corp., 477 F.Supp. 975, 989 (D.N.J. 1979). However, instances of actual confusion are particular persuasive and important evidence proving the fact of a likelihood of confusion.

In Scott Paper, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals set forth then (10) factors to be considered in determining whether a "likelihood of confusion" exists, as follows:

The ten factors do not, however, have equal weight. The most important of the ten factors is the similarity of the marks. Thus, when an infringer uses the exact same trademark or service mark, "there is a great likelihood of confusion." U.S. Jaycees v. Philadelphia Jaycees, 639 F.2d 134, 142 (3^rd Cir. 1981).