International Law

Korea?s Own Coming Mortgage Crisis

While I don’t usually rely on the Korea Times as a source of information, because it’s crappy and there is a self-censorship going on over there, it is in English and that means a link to the story doesn’t require ol’ Brendon to undertake a translation job in order to write about something on this blog. And that has some value in and of itself.

Over the weekend a story appeared on the Korea Times website about the risks associated with Korea’s housing prices and home loans, a topic near and dear to my heart. It seems Korea’s housing finance system puts borrowers at risk in a manner similar to the sub-prime meltdown and coming adjustable-rate mortgage tsunami in the States.

You see, virtually all (90%, according to the Korea Times story) of Korea’s home loans are adjustable-rate mortgages, the kind which are now roiling the US housing market as they reset. Foreign bankers at HSBC, KEB, and Citibank have tried to interest Korean borrowers in fixed-rate loan products, but the market has heretofore been wholly uninterested in such loans. Korean borrowers prefer, and therefore the banks provide, adjustable-rate mortgages. When we bought our apartment, although I specifically instructed my wife (since Korean banks refuse to lend to foreigners, even those with a good job and 12 years’ continuous residency) to get a long-term, fixed rate product, she brought back an adjustable-rate loan—and then argued with me about how stupid the long-term, fixed rate product was. (Why my wife refuses all finance advice from me may be another story.)

But Koreans do Southern California one better. Korean housing loans, in general, are also not “fully-amortizing” loans—instead, borrowers take out an interest-only loan with a term of one to three years, during which time they pay only the interest and none of the principal (although, like my family, they might save separately and pay down the principal that way). At the expiration of the term they roll the note over. Why don’t they pay any of the principal during the term of the loan? Well, for starters, just like the fools in the US housing bubble, nearly all Koreans are convinced that “Real estate only goes up. They’re not making any more land, you know.” But also, the principal balances—even on 50% LTV loans—usually exceed six or seven times the borrowers’ annual income. As a result, the interest expense is too great to add principal repayment to the burden.

Besides, because property always goes up, and lately has gone up like wildfire, only a sucker would pay principal now. You can take care of that when you sell the property, from all the capital appreciation that’s guaranteed to occur! After all, real estate only goes up. They’re not making anymore land, you know.

Now we add the risk factor of the variable-rate loans. Because of the wild property bubble inflation of the last few years, a lot of Koreans have stretched themselves by buying into properties on which they can barely afford the interest-only payments. Interest rates have been quite low of late, with housing loans in the high 5% range available (again, not to you, Mr. Good-Job Foreigner, but any Korean on the street could get one).

But what happens when the interest rate increases, say, to the high 7% range? That interest-only payment, which the homeowner could barely afford in the first place, is now almost 40% greater than it was before. A W1,000,000 payment (which would comprise half the after-tax monthly income of the average Korean wage earner) is now almost W1,400,000. It becomes that much harder to pay the interest. (Remember, most borrowers don’t touch the principal.) Also, since local banks are now required to examine the borrower’s ability to continue to service the loan, by comparing the payment burden to the disposable income of the borrower, many Korean homeowners may find it hard to roll those notes over.

And that means lots of foreclosure sales, or short sales, coming soon. But those tend to depress prices. So mark my words, Korea’s property is entering a deflationary phase. In Japan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, at least, past experience with property bubbles has shown us losses of up to 70% are possible.

Here’s where the 50% loan-to-value ratio hurts the Korean homeowner more heinously than the Americans who’ve lost their homes in the sub-prime crisis: The price decline eats up equity first—the bank’s loan gets paid off in the repossession sale, with the homeowner getting what’s left. This means in the coming bubble deflation, years and years of hard-earned cash savings are about to be lost. In the States, people get dinged on their credit scores and lose a few thousand dollars on the down payment (and no-money-down buyers just lose the imaginary bubble gains)—in Korea, people are going to lose real, hard-to-replace cash.

This is going to be ugly.

Full post as published by Korea Law Blog on July 20, 2008 (boomark / email).