Corporate Governance

Dodge v. Ford and the Proper Purpose of a Corporation

By Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance

(Editor?s note: This post is by Professor Lynn Stout of UCLA School of Law and Professor Jonathan Macey of Yale Law School.)

In the latest issue of the Virginia Law & Business Review, we debate whether the classic case of Dodge v. Ford, and its claim that maximizing shareholder wealth is the proper purpose of a business corporation, deserves a place in the modern legal canon. Lynn argues that Dodge v. Ford is bad law, at least when cited for the principle that corporate directors should maximize shareholder wealth. As a positive matter, Lynn suggests, no modern jurisdiction follows this rule, and as a normative matter, advances in economic theory suggest that the goal of shareholder wealth maximization is at best inefficient and at worst incoherent. Jon argues that shareholder wealth maximization is both conceptually coherent and consistent with economic theory, and that Dodge v. Ford can be used to illustrate the fact that shareholder wealth maximization is both a valid goal for corporate law and an ethical requirement, even in contexts in which enforceability is practically impossible.

The debate can be found here.

Full post as published by The Harvard Law School Corporate Governance Blog on May 22, 2008 (boomark / email).