International Law

Shambaugh on Chinese Nationalism

By Stan

Excellent little Op/Ed in the IHT by David Shambaugh on Chinese nationalism. Shambaugh is the head of the China program at GW (the Elliott School). For a while, he and Harry Harding were there at the same time before the latter’s departure in 2005. Shambaugh is one of the heavies in the U.S. as far as China studies/international relations are concerned.

The article is neither an apologist’s take on recent media criticism nor an example of Beijing bashing. It is a fairly standard and neutral summary of some of the factors that make up modern Chinese nationalism. It’s an Op/Ed, so there isn’t much depth there, but it’s a nice sketch of the high points. If you’ve never studied modern Chinese history, you’ll learn something. Here’s the author’s take on the origins of what he considers to be one strain of modern China nationalism:

Where does it come from? This aggrieved strain of Chinese nationalism has deep roots stretching back to the indignities foisted on China by European colonial powers, American missionaries and Japanese invaders from the 18th through the mid-20th centuries, a period officially referred in Chinese textbooks today as "the century of shame and humiliation."

The Boxer Rebellion of 1900, the 1902 anti-American boycott, the May Fourth Movement of 1919, the New Life Movement of 1934 and similar events animated anti-Western nationalism during the first half of the 20th century, until Mao and the Communists were able to capitalize on these powerful emotions and seize power in 1949.

The international community needs to understand the depth of this historical experience and sentiment in Chinese society and collective psyche.

It represents the raison d’être of the modern Chinese Communist state, which came to power on a promise to unify the nation, restore its dignity and never again permit foreigners to subjugate, discriminate against or try to "split" China.

After writing the above, I noticed that Paul Midler has weighed in on this article as well. He had two issues: one was the use of the term "xenophobic" by Shambaugh, and the other was the identification of two distinct types of Chinese nationalism.

As to the use of "xenophobic," I think it is accurate to describe certain instances of anti-foreigner sentiment, although it would not be a fair descriptor of Chinese feelings for foreigners generally (and I do not think Shambaugh was using it that way). I think that the recent Huawei-3Com fight in the U.S. was an example of American xenophobia, so perhaps I have a lower threshold for what I deem proper use of the term.

With regard to this idea of two nationalisms, it’s an interesting point. Shambaugh says that there is a traditional anti-foreigner mentality that has its roots in modern Chinese history (hard to argue with this), but that there is a new sort of protectionist feeling that is rooted in the present and future and is related to China’s emergence as a global power, its image in the world, the effects of globalization on trade and jobs in this country, etc. It’s a delicate splitting of hairs perhaps, but I find some truth to this. Perhaps over time, the first type of nationalism will fade out to be replaced by the second type?

Full post as published by China Hearsay on May 06, 2008 (boomark / email).